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The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of this cross-appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 (3)(j). 
n. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
A. Did the trial court err in refusing plaintiffs proposed Jury Instruction No. 
18 regarding an award of consequential damages, including the attorney fees incurred by 
plaintiff in this case? 
Standard of Review: The failure to give a requested jury instruction is reversible 
error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or 
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law. Matter of the Estate of Kesler. 
702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985); Jorgensen v. Issa. 739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987); Biswell v. 
Duncan. 742 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987); Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 
1987); and Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1988). 
Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction presents a 
question of law only, no particular deference is given to the trial court's rulings. Carpet 
Barn v. State, bv and through DOT. 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App. 1990) and Ramon, by and 
through Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131 (Utah 1989). 
B. Did the trial court err in granting defendant summary judgment on 
plaintiffs cause of action for breach of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing? 
Standard of Review: Correctness of the trial court's ruling, and no particular 
deference should be given the court's conclusion. Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 
506 (Utah 1990), Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Transamerica Cash 
Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990); and Automotive Mfrs., etc. v. Serv. 
Auto Parts. Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). 
C Did the trial court err in granting defendant summary judgment on 
plaintiffs cause of action for violation of public policy sounding in tort? 
Standard of Review: Same as stated in issue B above. 
D. Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs cause of action for violation 
of public policy sounding in contract? 
Standard of Review: Same as stated in issues B and C above. 
m. 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
U.C.A. Section 7-1-318. The foregoing statute is set forth verbatim and attached 
hereto as Addendum A. 
rv. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
This is a wrongful termination of employment case. Ivan J. Heslop's (hereinafter 
"Heslop") Complaint contained seven causes of action. (Record on Appeal, hereinafter 
"R.", 1-12) The trial court dismissed Heslop's cause of action for defamation by Order 
dated May 25, 1989. (R. 250-251) By Order and Judgment dated July 10, 1989, the 
court granted the Bank of Utah's (hereinafter "the Bank") Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Heslop's causes of action for promissory estoppel, breach of implied-in-law 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The Order denied the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment on Heslop's causes of 
action for breach of implied-in-fact contract and contractual wrongful discharge, including 
the claim of a public policy violation. The court reserved ruling on Heslop's cause of 
action for tortious wrongful discharge, including the claim of a public policy violation 
sounding in tort. The court also ruled that Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989) applied retroactively to the case. (R. 359-361) A copy of the Order 
and Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
On May 22, 1990, the trial court granted the Bank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Heslop's cause of action for tortious wrongful discharge, including a public 
policy violation sounding in tort, dismissing all claims for tort damages and punitive 
damages. The court's decision was based on its interpretation of Lowe v. Sorensen 
Research Company, Inc., 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). (R. 475-476) A copy of the Partial 
Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
Prior to trial, the Bank made a Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of the 
accrual problem and subsequent investigations of the Bank. The motion was based on 
Rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. By Order dated June 13, 1990, the 
trial court denied the Bank's motion. (R. 487-488) A copy of the Order is attached 
hereto as Addendum D. 
The liability issues at the beginning of trial were, 1) whether Heslop was 
constructively discharged; 2) whether he had an implied-in-fact contract terminable only 
for good cause; 3) whether there was good cause to terminate; and 4) whether he had 
been terminated in violation of public policy (sounding in contract). At the end of 
Heslop's case in chief, the trial court granted the Bank's Motion to Dismiss Heslop's 
public policy claim. (Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter MTr.M, 1149-1151) At the 
conclusion of all evidence, the Bank moved for a directed verdict on the remaining issues 
3 
in the case. The trial court denied the Motion on the issue of good cause to terminate 
and took the remainder of the Motion under advisement pending the jury's verdict. (Tr. 
1544-1561) 
The jury returned a special verdict, finding that Heslop did not voluntarily resign, 
that he had an implied-in-fact contract terminable only for good cause, that the Bank did 
not have good cause to terminate him, and that he had incurred general damages in the 
amount of $160,000.00. (R. 644-645) 
Judgment on the Verdict was signed on August 27, 1990. (R. 648a-648b) A copy 
of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum E. The court denied the Bank's 
Motion for J.N.O.V. or in the alternative, for a New Trial by Order dated October 16, 
1990. (R. 1182-1184) A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
Heslop's Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed November 23, 1990. (R. 1193-1194) A copy 
of the Notice of Cross-Appeal is attached hereto as Addendum G. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Heslop's Employment Background and the Bank's Policy of 
Terminating Employment Only for Good Cause 
Heslop was an employee of the Bank for over 25 years. (Exhibit, hereinafter 
"Ex.", 2P; Tr. 290) He was first employed at the Bank on March 20 or 21, 1955. (Ex. 
IP, 2P; Tr. 112) He worked as a collector and then a loan officer in the installment loan 
department. (Tr. 115) On January 26, 1955, or nearly two months prior to his first 
hiring, Heslop completed an application for employment at the Bank which contained 
requests for personal information and an employment-at-will clause. (Tr. 114; Ex. IP) 
The trial court ruled that this employment application did not rise to the dignity of an 
employment contract. (R. 1183) Heslop quit his first employment at the Bank in August 
or September 1959. (Tr. 290) 
4 
In August or September 1962, Heslop approached Frank Browning about 
re-employment with the Bank. (Tr. 116) Frank Browning was one of the founders of 
the Bank. (Tr. 292) He was also chairman of the Board of Directors and President of 
the Bank at that time. (Tr. 816) Frank Browning arranged for Heslop to meet with his 
son, Roderick Browning (hereinafter "Browning") and William Beutler (hereinafter 
"Beutler"), both officers of the Bank. (Tr. 116, 817) Beutler testified that 
Frank Browning said he wanted Heslop back in the Bank. There was no question in 
Beutler's mind that Heslop would be rehired. The only questions were the amount of his 
salary and the terms of his employment. (Tr. 817) 
At the employment interview, Heslop was informed of the Bank's personnel 
policies: a seniority system, promotion from within the organization, and termination of 
employment only for good cause. (Tr. 118-120) The interviewers explained to Heslop 
that the Bank only terminated employment for good cause because it wanted to provide 
an incentive for employees to remain with the Bank and develop into experienced 
personnel. (Tr. 120) 
Heslop also inquired of his interviewers if he could immediately begin 
participating in the Bank's profit sharing plan since he had four and a half years of prior 
service. He was later informed that the Bank considered him a new employee, therefore, 
he was required to successfully complete a 90-day probationary period before he could 
begin receiving benefits. (Tr. 117) 
Heslop was not asked to sign an employment application upon rehire in 1962. 
(Tr. 119, 818) He was rehired for career employment. No one from the Bank told him 
that he was being hired for six months, a year, six years, ten years, or any fixed period of 
time. (Tr. 293) A copy of this page of the Transcript is attached hereto as Addendum H. 
On cross-examination, Heslop testified that he understood he would have 
employment at the Bank until he retired, unless there was good cause to terminate. The 
5 
Bank's counsel then asked, "And at that time you intended to retire at what age, 65?" 
Heslop responded, "That was the standard, the expected age of retirement then, yes." 
(Tr. 296) A copy of this page of the Transcript is attached hereto as Addendum I. 
Heslop never said that he had a fixed employment contract to the specific age of 65. Dr. 
Cris Lewis, an expert witness, testified that the normal age of retirement used to be 65. 
(Tr. 935) 
Browning testified that he did not expressly tell Heslop he was employed until 
retirement and could be terminated only for good cause. He also testified that he did 
not hear Beutler say that to Heslop. (Tr. 1017) Browning's testimony was incongruous 
because he also said that he could not even remember the interview with Heslop in 1962. 
(Tr. 1099-1100) Beutler had no specific recollection of the meeting other than Heslop 
was rehired. (Tr. 818, 881) 
Beutler did, however, remember the Bank's personnel policy. He testified that 
employees were required to satisfactorily complete a 90-day probationary period, after 
which they would only be terminated for good cause. (Tr. 818-819) He also testified 
that the Bank used a seniority system and new employees were told that the Bank's 
policy was to promote from within the organization whenever possible. (Tr. 819) 
Beutler did not recall hearing Frank Browning or Browning ever expressly say that 
no one could be terminated from the Bank except for good cause. (Tr. 886) In fact, he 
could not recall any instance where he said, or anyone else said, that Bank employees 
could only be terminated for good cause. Beutler's testimony was clearly that he did not 
recall. When asked the question, "You are not saying that it never happened?" he 
responded, "I am not saying it never did happen. It could have easily happened." (Tr. 
919) 
Several other long-term Officers and Directors of the Bank testified at trial. 
Gerald West (hereinafter "West") was employed at the Bank from 1962 until 1984. (Tr. 
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503) He understood that the Bank's personnel policy was to terminate employment only 
for good cause, promote from within the organization, and give employees with the 
longest service the first chance at job opportunities as they became available. (Tr. 506-
508, 572) West testified that he had no input into the creation of the employment 
application he signed. (Tr. 571) He also said that the personnel policy that existed at 
the Bank, and that was explained in a lot of discussions, was actually different than the 
at-will statement contained in the employment application. (Tr. 545, 572) 
James Packer (hereinafter "Packer") was employed at the Bank from 1958 to 1986 
(Tr. 586) He testified that the Bank's practice was to place a new employee in a position 
for a probationary period. If successfully completed, the employee was permanently 
placed in the position and could only be terminated if there were a legitimate underlying 
reason. (Tr. 620) He also said that based on what he was told, the Bank's actual policy 
regarding termination was different than the statement in his employment application. 
(Tr. 642) 
Gerald Peacock (hereinafter "Peacock") was employed at the Bank from 1975 
through 1983 (Tr. 644) He testified that the Bank's policy was to terminate only for 
good cause. He said the actual policy was "more lenient by far" than that contained in 
the employment application he signed. (Tr. 676, 698) 
Boyd Carlson (hereinafter "Carlson") was employed at the Bank from 1960 
through 1983. When asked to describe the Bank's personnel policy, he responded: 
A . . . Colonel Frank Browning instilled in all of us a belief of 
looking out for each other as a family. And if we put in a lot 
of hard work, and a lot of extra hours, we would be rewarded 
in the end. I felt that it was a good place to work. As long 
as I did my job and I performed the duties that I was asked 
to do and assigned, that my employment would last. 
Roy Nelson was one of the individuals who hired me, and he 
pointed out to me at the time that they had a real good profit 
sharing plan. And if I stayed there through retirement, I 
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could have a very nice balance in that account to retire on. 
And all of this made a real nice package for me to look 
forward to. 
Q Did you discuss the fact that this would be career 
employment at the bank? 
A Yes. And it was presented as such . . . . 
(Tr. 702, 703) 
Carlson testified that until the summer of 1983, the Bank's policy was to terminate 
employment only for good cause. (Tr. 704) Heslop was terminated without good cause 
in the summer of 1983. The Bank's personnel policy was periodically restated to Carlson 
throughout the course of his employment. Carlson said that the employment application 
was just a standard form. He filled in the blanks and signed it. There was no 
negotiation. (Tr. 752) 
Edward Kleyn (hereinafter "Kleyn") was employed at the Bank from 
approximately 1973 to 1984 (Tr. 759) He testified that the Bank's policy was to 
terminate employment only for good cause. (Tr. 800) 
Even the Bank's own witness, Ray Kennedy (hereinafter "Kennedy"), testified that 
the Bank's policy was to terminate employment only if there was some good reason. (Tr. 
1364) Kennedy has been employed at the Bank for over 30 years. (Tr. 1354) He also 
said that the employment application was nothing more than an application for 
employment. (Tr. 1362) 
In 1962, Heslop's interviewers never said that the employment application he 
signed in 1955 would be revived, reactivated, or construed as an employment contract. 
(Tr. 119) 
Heslop was rehired as a loan officer in the installment and commercial loan 
departments. (Tr. 121; Ex. 2P) He was appointed an officer of the Bank in 1963 and 
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promoted to the position of Assistant Vice President. In 1966, he was promoted to Vice 
President. Heslop was appointed to the Officers' Executive Committee (hereinafter 
"OEC") in 1976. This promotion gave him much greater responsibility in the 
management of the Bank. In 1980, Heslop was promoted to Senior Vice President. He 
retained his duties as a member of the OEC, and in addition, was appointed manager of 
the Bank's Salt Lake division. (Tr. 121-122, 124) 
2. Accrual Problems and Heslop's Fall From Favor 
The four members of the OEC were Beutler, Packer, Kennedy, and Heslop. 
Beutler was the chairman. The OEC oversaw the general operation of the Bank. 
Browning succeeded his father as President and Chairman of the Bank's Board of 
Directors. The OEC members met weekly as a committee with Browning. They made a 
report and recommendation to Browning on any matter of major consequence. The 
OEC also met each month with the Bank's Directors' Executive Committee (hereinafter 
"DEC"). The DEC consisted of four or five Directors involved in setting Bank policy and 
reviewing major decisions. (Tr. 124) 
In 1980, there was a problem in the Bank's computer system which caused an 
over-accrual of the commercial loan account and an under-accrual of the time certificates 
of deposit (hereinafter "TCD") account. The Bank's income was overstated as a result of 
the problem. (Tr. 826, 838) In late 1980, Beutler became aware of the accrual problem. 
(Tr. 827) In about February 1981, Beutler informed the OEC members of the accrual 
problem. (Tr. 129-130, 829) Beutler informed Browning of the problem the same day or 
the same week that he told the OEC members. (Tr. 829) 
Beutler told the OEC that the TCD accrual account was off by as much as 
$200,000.00. (Tr. 130, 322) Heslop specifically asked if the accrual problem would be 
corrected before the next call report. Beutler said yes. (Tr. 131, 323) A call report is a 
statement of financial condition which the Bank was required by law to file with the State 
9 
Department of Financial Institutions. Filing a false call report is a third-degree felony. 
(Ex. 72P) 
The accrual problem next surfaced in a November 1981 OEC meeting. Heslop 
asked Beutler if the TCD accrual deficiency had been corrected. Beutler said it had not, 
and was probably one-half million dollars ($500,000.00) to one million dollars 
($1,000,000.00). (Tr. 135) Heslop was very upset and complained that the Bank was 
misrepresenting its income and assets. He insisted that Browning be informed of the 
problem. Beutler disagreed, but finally consented to place the matter on the agenda for 
the next OEC report to Browning. (Tr. 135, 834) Beutler, however, intentionally failed 
to mention the accrual problem in the meeting. (Tr. 136, 834) 
After the meeting, Heslop returned to his office in Salt Lake City, telephoned 
Browning, and reported the TCD accrual deficiency. (Tr. 136, 836) Heslop said he 
thought Beutler would be offended by his call, therefore, he would find another job if 
Browning wished. Browning responded that he would handle the problem without 
Beutler knowing of Heslop's call. (Tr. 136) 
At the following OEC meeting, Beutler told Heslop he was aware of the call to 
Browning. The two then engaged in a heated discussion which culminated in Beutler 
threatening Heslop's job. (Tr. 137-138, 332-334) Heslop argued that the Bank should 
forego profit sharing and dividends to immediately resolve the accrual deficiency. (Tr. 
138,334) 
In 1957, the Browning family owned less than 50% of the Bank's stock. That year 
there was a dispute among the owners of the Bank which was resolved when the 
Brownings secured a line of credit with another bank and purchased controlling interest 
in the Bank. Since then, the Brownings' policy has been to maintain absolute control of 
the Bank through ownership of at least 50% of the stock. Beutler testified that the debt 
service on the Brownings' credit line was paid from dividends that the Brownings 
10 
received on their large stockholdings at the Bank. Beutler understood that the Bank had 
to pay a dividend each year. (Tr. 824-826) 
In 1981 the Bank was operating near the lowest acceptable level of its capital 
requirement. The Federal Reserve has guidelines on the amount of capital, or owners' 
equity, that a Bank should have in relation to its deposits and overall size. Since the 
Bank was operating at the low end of that ratio, any charge-off or other action that 
reduced Bank capital would require a recapitalization of the Bank to bring the ratio back 
in line with Federal Reserve requirements. 
In early 1981, State and Federal regulators discovered a number of marginal loans 
on the Bank's books. The regulators were inclined to require a charge-off of these loans, 
however, through negotiation, the Bank was allowed to retain these loans on the books. 
The negotiations produced a Memorandum of Understanding Agreement dated 
February 27, 1981 between the Bank and its regulators. The Agreement required the 
Bank to furnish monthly reports to the regulators on the status of the marginal loans. 
(Tr. 822-824; Ex. 69D) 
Prior to November 1981, Beutler informed Browning of the size of the accrual 
problem at least every month. Beutler never shielded Browning from the problem. (Tr. 
898-901) Despite his assurances to Heslop and the members of the OEC, Beutler did 
nothing to resolve the accrual problem. (Tr. 899) When Heslop asked about the accrual 
problem in November 1981, Beutler had no intention of discussing it openly with 
Browning because he knew that Browning was already fully aware of the problem and 
did not want it disclosed. (Tr. 834) 
After receiving Heslop's telephone call about the accrual problem, Browning 
asked Beutler to come to his office. Browning informed Beutler of Heslop's call and was 
annoyed that Heslop had "opened the lid" on the accrual problem. Browning said the 
problem would have to be brought to the attention of the DEC. (Tr. 836) 
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Heslop's recommendation for resolving the accrual problem, i.e., recognizing it as 
a loss and immediately charging it to undivided profits, would have required one million 
five hundred thousand ($1,500,000.00) to two million dollars ($2,000,000.00) of new 
capital investment by stockholders to reach an acceptable level of capital under Federal 
Reserve regulations. Browning knew that he would have to contribute approximately half 
that amount to maintain the Brownings' 50%, or greater, ownership interest in the Bank. 
(Tr. 839) 
Heslop's method of resolving the accrual problem through a one-time charge was 
the only legitimate solution to the problem. (Tr. 840, 1253) Normal Bank procedure 
was to immediately correct a computational error once the problem was discovered. (Tr. 
511) Beutler, however, argued that the accrual problem should be resolved through 
monthly installment charges against undivided profits over a period of months or even 
years. (Tr. 325, 1026) Beutler told the OEC that he had consulted with an accountant, 
Fred Reed, of Elmer Fox & Company, who had advised him that the accrual problem 
could be resolved over time. He failed to mention, however, that they had only discussed 
the tax ramification of his solution to the problem. (Tr. 336, 589, 845-846) The other 
members of the OEC, Packer and Kennedy, took the position that they would do 
whatever was best for the Browning family and, therefore, they supported Beutler's 
method of resolving the accrual problem over time. (Tr. 840) Heslop continued to 
argue in meetings and day-to-day discussions with Officers and Directors of the Bank that 
the accrual problem should be resolved by an immediate charge to undivided profits. 
(Tr. 842) 
On December 3, 1981, the OEC met with Browning. The accrual problem was 
thoroughly discussed. (Tr. 335) Heslop expressed his view of how the accrual problem 
should be resolved. He stated that it would be wrong to file call reports before 
correcting the accrual accounts. (Tr. 144-145, 335) Beutler recommended to Browning 
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that the accrual problem be resolved over time. Beutler was assigned by Browning to 
review the topic the next day at the DEC meeting. (Tr. 144, 843; Ex. 65P) 
The OEC members, including Heslop, attended the DEC meeting to answer 
questions, but had no vote. At the December 4, 1981 DEC meeting, Beutler reported to 
the Directors on the TCD accrual deficiency, but the significance of the problem was 
down-played. Beutler's report was the sixth of seven items on the agenda. (Tr. 844-845; 
Ex. 65P) Heslop was never asked to give his opinion on the accrual problem at the 
meeting. (Tr. 145-146, 470-471) 
Four Directors knew of Heslop's concerns about the accuracy of the call report 
prior to the DEC meeting. (Tr. 348) Although Heslop's speech was limited by Bank 
protocol, he was able to suggest an outside audit. Bank attorney and DEC member, 
David Kunz (hereinafter "Kunz"), responded, "It was just a paper entry anyway, no 
money has been taken, we will have it cleared up before the Feds find out about it." (Tr. 
146-147, 338, 470-471) Beutler told the Directors that the TCD accrual deficiency 
amounted to approximately $700,000.00. (Tr. 833, 845) The DEC voted to implement 
Beutler's recommendation to resolve the TCD accrual problem over time. (Tr. 847) 
Beutler told Heslop not to mention the accrual problem at the meeting of the entire 
Board of Directors on December 8, 1981. (Tr. 474) 
In early December 1981, Heslop began preparing personal notes about events 
relating to the accrual problem. (See Ex. 39P) Some of the Directors were hesitant to 
sign the call report for the quarter ending December 31, 1981. (Tr. 148) 
Browning was contemptuous of Heslop for exposing the accrual problem. He was 
angry because the problem had to be disclosed to the other Directors. Browning told 
Packer that he was disappointed in Heslop for not supporting the method chosen by the 
DEC to resolve the accrual problem. (Tr. 597, 856-857) Kunz was also contemptuous of 
Heslop for exposing the accrual problem. He did not hide his dislike for Heslop and 
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stated his belief that Heslop should have been a team player like Beutler, Packer, and 
Kennedy. (Tr. 854, 856) Kunz expressed to Packer a lack of confidence in Heslop. He 
also expressed concern about the amount of responsibility that Heslop had as a Senior 
Vice President and member of the OEC. Kunz instructed Packer to monitor some of 
Heslop's activities. (Tr. 596) 
Kunz had been legal counsel and a Director at the Bank since 1958. He was fully 
aware that the Browning family wanted to maintain at least 50% stock ownership interest 
in the Bank. (Tr. 1457, 1488, 857) 
In March 1981, Beutler began making "wash entries" in the TCD accrual account 
when the quarterly call reports came due. The purpose of a wash entry was to hide the 
deficiency in the TCD accrual account from Bank regulators. (Tr. 831-832, 681) 
Packer was aware of the wash entries and other Officers and Directors may have 
also known. Heslop, however, was not aware of the wash entries. (Tr. 832-833) A wash 
entry was made for the quarter ending December 31, 1981. (Tr. 847) 
On July 9, 1982, Beutler sent a letter to the Federal and State Bank regulators 
informing them of the accrual problem and the method being used to resolve the 
problem. (Ex. 47D; Tr. 858-860, 911-912) On August 2, 1982, the Federal and State 
regulators began a regular examination of the Bank. (Tr. 149-150, 350) The examiners 
were aware of Beutler's letter and the existence of an accrual problem at the Bank. (Tr. 
970-971) The examiners were not exclusively looking for wrongdoing by Beutler. (Tr. 
976) They did, however, immediately investigate the accrual problem. 
Beutler told the examiners that the regulators were not informed of the accrual 
problem on the call reports because the bank wanted to avoid being forced to inject 
more capital. Beutler also said that all Directors knew of the situation. (Ex. 73P) 
On August 6, 1982, Elaine Weis, (hereinafter "Weis"), Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions, called a special meeting of the Bank's Board of 
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Directors at her office in Salt Lake City. At the meeting, Weis issued an order 
suspending Beutler as Executive Vice President and Director pending a hearing, 
requiring an immediate outside audit of the Bank, requiring that a representative of the 
Commissioner be placed in residence at the Bank, requiring the Bank to file corrected 
call reports, precluding the transfer of certain Bank assets, and specifically finding that 
Beutler violated Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-318, relating to the filing of false call reports. 
(See Ex. 67P) 
The following week, Kunz requested that Beutler meet him at his home. He 
advised Beutler that he had the right to a hearing, but said he wanted him to waive the 
hearing and resign. Beutler protested taking the fall for an action approved by Browning 
and the Board of Directors. Kunz persisted and Beutler inquired about termination pay. 
The Bank holding company, Tennessee Homestead, ultimately purchased Beutler's 
vacant condominium that had been on the market for about six months. Beutler rode 
with Kunz to Weis' office to discuss Beutler's standing at the Bank. Beutler later waived 
his right to a hearing, thereby causing his permanent suspension from the Bank. (Tr. 
870-874) 
After the Commissioner's order was issued, Ron Draughon (hereinafter 
"Draughon") was appointed as Weis' representative in residence at the Bank. In 
mid-August, Weis was curious if Browning and Kunz knew of the extent of the accrual 
problem before the examination. She considered Browning and Kunz the two most 
influential members of the Board of Directors. Weis asked Draughon to talk to them to 
determine if they knew more than she thought they did. 
Draughon asked Browning and Kunz if they had previously known that there was 
such a large accrual problem. Browning said he was really surprised and did not realize 
that the Bank had such a big problem. Kunz did not respond in a surprised manner. He 
said he did not realize the extent of the problem. (Tr. 977-979, 993-994) 
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Heslop testified that Draughon asked him if other Officers and Directors knew of 
the accrual problem prior to the examination. Heslop explained that the OEC, DEC, the 
auditor, Browning, and Kunz all knew of the accrual problem. Draughon returned a 
short time later and said they claimed they did not know anything about it. (Tr. 177-178) 
Draughon stayed in residence at the Bank until about September 2, 1982. After 
Beutler's suspension, the remaining members of the OEC continued to oversee the 
day-to-day operation of the Bank. Upon leaving, Draughon wrote a letter to Browning 
commending Bank management. (See Ex. 75P) 
3. Attorney General's Investigation 
In September 1983, the Utah Attorney General's office (hereinafter "Attorney 
General") began an investigation of the Bank to determine if there was any criminal 
wrongdoing. (Tr. 153-154) Heslop received a telephone call on or about September 13, 
1982, and was asked to meet with the Attorney General. (Tr. 153-154) The meeting was 
held shortly after the call. (Tr. 354) Heslop agreed to meet with the Attorney General 
to show his willingness to cooperate with the investigation. He did not want to be 
implicated with the Officers and Directors who recommended that the accrual problem 
be resolved over time. Conversely, Heslop was concerned about his future employment 
and the appearance that he was instigating an investigation of his employer and fellow 
employees. He, therefore, requested that the Attorney General subpoena his testimony 
and documentary evidence and that he have counsel present during the questioning. (Tr. 
154-156, 357, 477-478) The Attorney General said he understood and respected Heslop's 
position and subpoenas would be served if necessary. (Tr. 155-156) 
That evening, Kunz called Heslop at home and angrily inquired if he had met with 
the Attorney General earlier that day. When Heslop replied that he had, Kunz said, 
"Why the hell did you do that? If you had come to see us, we would have never let you 
talk to them." Heslop explained that he gave no information and requested legal counsel 
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and a subpoena. Kunz said the Bank did not want the investigation made public, and by 
issuing subpoenas, the matter would become public knowledge. He said the Bank was 
trying to avoid having the investigation go to that point. (Tr. 157-158, 479) On 
September 23, 1982, the Attorney General called Heslop and said authorization had been 
given to serve Heslop, Packer, and Kennedy with subpoenas. (Tr. 158) 
The Bank retained Robert Moore (hereinafter "Moore") and Wayne Black 
(hereinafter "Black") to represent it in the Attorney General's investigation. Heslop met 
with Moore at his law office on October 12, 1982. Moore interrogated him about his 
prior meeting with the Attorney General. Heslop requested his own attorney because he 
thought Moore had a conflict of interest. Moore said he did not see the need for him to 
have separate counsel. Moore lied to Heslop by saying that his personal notes would be 
privileged, and not subject to subpoena, if he turned them over to Black and Moore. 
Moore wanted to hide the notes from the Attorney General. At the conclusion of the 
meeting, Moore suggested that Heslop contact Paul Kunz (hereinafter "P. Kunz"). (Tr. 
159-166,477; Ex. 39P) 
David Kunz and Paul Kunz ("Kunz" and "P. Kunz") are brothers. Both 
represented the Bank. (Tr. 720) Kunz had a long conversation with Moore after the 
meeting with Heslop. (Ex. 92P) On October 14, 1982, Heslop and P. Kunz met with 
Black in his law office. Black said he was representing all Bank Officers. Heslop said his 
personal notes indicated that the DEC had full knowledge of the accrual problem. Black 
also lied to Heslop by saying that if the notes were given to him, they would become 
privileged, and not subject to subpoena. Black and P. Kunz eventually persuaded Heslop 
to surrender his personal notes. (Tr. 166-169; Ex. 39P) A copy of pertinent pages from 
Heslop's notes is attached hereto as Addendum J. 
Kunz obtained possession of Heslop's personal notes and told Browning about 
them. He said Heslop's notes were derogatory toward Bank management. (Tr. 1060) 
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The Bank's attorneys devised a strategy to use Thomas Timmons (hereinafter 
"Timmons"), who was supervising a supposedly independent audit of the Bank, to assuage 
the Attorney General's investigation. (Tr. 160-162, 1327; Ex. 92P) A copy of Kunz' 
October 1982 billing statement is attached hereto as Addendum K. 
Timmons told the Attorney General that the Bank was managed by people who 
were naive and who did not know what they were doing. Consequently, according to 
Timmons, there was no intentional filing of false call reports. (Tr. 182, 1326) 
On November 15, 1982, Heslop accompanied Black to a meeting with the 
Attorney General. Black argued for an end to the investigation. Heslop said he did not 
think any of the Directors signed the call reports with intent to defraud the Bank. He 
stated that the Attorney General or the court should answer the question of whether the 
Directors knowingly signed false call reports. (Tr. 170-171) Later, Heslop called the 
Attorney General and inquired about the status of the investigation. He was told that it 
may have concluded and that no subpoenas would be issued. Heslop expressed concern 
about his future employment at the Bank. (Tr. 175-176) 
4. Peat, Marwick & Mitchell Audit and the Hiring of Thomas Timmons 
Weis' Order of August 6, 1982 required the Bank to retain an independent 
accounting firm, designated by the Commissioner, to perform a complete audit of the 
Bank's records. (Ex. 67P) Weis designated the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick & 
Mitchell (hereinafter "PMM") to perform the audit. Timmons supervised the audit for 
PMM. (Tr. 151-152, 360) Weis contacted PMM in August 1982 and requested a 
complete audit of the Bank's records for the years 1980, 1981, and through July 31, 1982. 
Timmons told the Bank's Board of Directors that PMM would conduct the audit for 
approximately $84,000.00. (Tr. 152) Browning considered $84,000.00 a reasonable 
estimate for the PMM audit because it included the cost of reconstructing the books to 
July 31, 1982. (Tr,. 1111) 
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After beginning work on the audit, PMM discovered that it could not complete all 
the work requested by Weis. Instead, PMM limited its work to a balance sheet audit. 
The services not provided by PMM had been given an estimated cost of $25,000.00. (Tr. 
1232, 1309-1310; Ex. 80P) 
Timmons promoted a profitability study of the Bank by PMM. The estimated cost 
was $80,000.00. Certain Bank Officers, including Heslop, opposed the profitability study 
because the cost was excessive and the information could be derived in-house. The 
Board of Directors approved the study over the objection of senior management. (Tr. 
180-181, 606-609) PMM also audited the Bank for the remaining five months of 1982. 
(Tr. 1232) The Bank actually paid PMM the total sum of $445,930.68. (Ex. 82P) 
The PMM audit work had not been completed by the end of October 1982. The 
audit report was completed and delivered to the Bank in early December 1982. (Tr. 
1238-1239) The PMM audit recommended that the Bank resolve the accrual deficiency 
by a one-time charge to undivided profits. (Tr. 1253-1254) This was the same solution 
that Heslop initially proposed in November 1981. 
After making the one-time charge, the Bank did not meet the Federal Reserve 
capital requirements so Browning and other stockholders input more capital. (Tr. 665-
666) 
In November or early December 1982, while PMM people were still at the Bank, 
Heslop observed that the OEC was being bypassed, and its recommendations for the 
day-to-day management of the Bank were ignored. (Tr. 282-283) 
The Bank hired Timmons as President on December 17, 1982. His official 
starting day was January 17, 1983. The Bank paid Timmons a signing bonus of 
$60,000.00 and a starting annual salary of $150,000.00 with an annual increase of 10% 
over the five-year term of the contract. He also received generous benefits and an 
19 
annual bonus based on net profits which amounted to $50,000.00 his first year. (Ex. 83P; 
Tr. 1306) 
In contrast, Browning's annual salary as President was $75,000.00 and Beutler's 
annual salary as Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer was $54,000.00. 
(Tr. 1127, 904) 
Timmons had approximately 14 months of actual banking experience as a Vice 
President of a small bank in Pekin, Illinois. He had approximately nine and a half years 
experience working as a Certified Public Accountant for PMM. (Tr. 1222-1229) 
5. Heslop's Demotion to Agricultural Loan Specialist and the Bank's 
Policy of Not Making Agricultural Loans 
When Timmons assumed the position of President, significant changes occurred at 
the Bank. There was a reorganization of personnel, a layoff of employees, and 
approximately eight branches were sold. (Tr. 636-637) At the same time, the Bank 
constructed a lavish office in Salt Lake City for Timmons. (Tr. 617) 
The OEC was abolished. (Tr. 637, 1056) Packer was removed from his position 
as manager of the Northern Division Commercial Loan Department and placed in charge 
of marketing and business development. Kennedy was replaced as manager of the Real 
Estate Loan Department. (Tr. 638) 
Heslop was demoted to the position of Agricultural Loan Specialist. His 
supervisory and managerial responsibilities were removed and he was placed at the 
lowest level for a loan officer. (Tr. 125-126, 505; Ex. 5P) He retained his same salary 
and title as Senior Vice President. (Tr. 2369-370) Browning testified that a Senior Vice 
President would generally have supervision over other employees. As Agricultural Loan 
Specialist, Heslop had no supervision over other loan officers. Also, his benefits at the 
Bank were substantially reduced. (Tr. 1179, 190-191) 
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In April 1983, there was an across-the-board increase in lending limits for loan 
officers at the Bank. The increase in lending authority was not a promotion for Heslop 
and benefited only the Bank. (Tr. 469-470; Ex. 50D) As the Bank's Agricultural Loan 
Specialist, Heslop assisted his direct supervisor, Kleyn, in servicing many of the Bank's 
agricultural loans. (Tr. 373) 
Heslop was informed of his demotion to Agricultural Loan Specialist by Timmons 
on or about January 14, 1983. He objected to the demotion and said he would like to 
speak to Browning about the matter. Timmons replied that it would not do any good 
because the decision had already been made. (Tr. 194; Ex. 39P) 
On January 15, 1983, Heslop met with Browning, who was still officially President 
of the Bank, and objected to the demotion. He asked if Browning wanted him to resign. 
Browning said he thought Heslop should stay with the Bank, which Heslop did. (Tr. 194-
196; Ex. 39P) Browning did not ask Heslop to resign because he wanted to avoid the 
turnover in key personnel at a critical time for the Bank. (Tr. 998-999, 1311-1312) 
Heslop continued to work as a commercial loan officer and Agricultural Loan Specialist 
from January 1983 until October 1983. 
West was appointed supervisor over all commercial lending in the reorganization. 
(Tr. 503, 547; Ex. 5P) During a meeting in mid-January 1983, Timmons asked West if he 
thought he would have any problem working with Heslop. He said if West thought there 
would be a problem, Heslop would be eliminated. (Tr. 503-504) 
After Heslop was demoted to Agricultural Loan Specialist, Timmons verbally 
instituted a policy that the Bank would no longer make any agricultural loans. (Tr. 126, 
191) The verbal policy was later slightly modified and incorporated into the Bank's 
written loan policy which became effective in April 1983. (Ex. 17P) 
The written loan policy granted individual lending officers full authority to pool 
their lending limits and approve a loan to the extent of their aggregate limit. In such 
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instances, consultation with the senior Officers, other Officers or the Loan Committee 
was encouraged. (Ex. 17P) 
Loan Policy No. 13 listed types of desireable and undesirable loans. Undesirable 
loans would ordinarily be declined unless specifically approved by the Loan Committee. 
Undesirable loans included loans to establish a new business enterprise, if repayment of 
the loan was dependent solely upon the profitable future operation of the enterprise, in 
the absence of supporting additional collateral or financially-substantial guarantors; and 
loans whose repayment was dependent solely upon the marketing of a growing crop or 
livestock, in the absence of supporting additional collateral or financially-substantial 
guarantors. (Ex. 17P) 
6. Heslop's Constructive Discharge 
In July 1983, Beutler sued the Bank for wrongful discharge and in August 
subpoenaed Heslop's personal notes. Heslop complied with the subpoena and the 
Bank's attorneys obtained a copy of his notes. Heslop went to lunch one afternoon and 
passed Timmons in the parking lot. Timmons rudely snubbed Heslop. Heslop learned 
later that afternoon that Timmons had gone to the attorneys' office earlier that day to 
read his notes. (Tr. 200-210, 467; Ex. 6P) 
In early August 1983, Heslop was approached by Larry Richins (hereinafter 
"Richins"), a certified public accountant, about a $260,000.00 loan to Clayton Gabbert, 
M.D. (hereinafter "Gabbert") The purpose of the loan was to create a tax shelter for 
Gabbert through the purchase of 310 head of cattle which would then be leased to 
Richins' Dairy in Newton, Utah. Richins planned to hire an experienced herdsman and 
expert dairy consultants to select the cattle and operate the dairy. Gabbert would then 
use the lease payments to make his loan payments to the Bank. (Tr. 203-204, 226) The 
lease payments would come from dairy income. The cattle would secure the loan from 
the Bank. (Tr. 227, 237, 751) At that time, dairy cows were worth approximately 
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$1,000.00 per head. The Bank loan would be used to purchase 260 cows and Gabbert 
would contribute $50,000.00 for an additional 50 cows which would constitute additional 
security for the Bank loan since all 310 head would be secured. (Tr. 213, 220, 447-448, 
460) 
On August 5, 1983, Heslop presented the Gabbert loan to the Loan Committee 
for approval. (Ex. 7P) In support of the loan, Heslop submitted Gabbert's personal 
financial statement showing a net worth of $520,000.00, Richin's personal financial 
statement showing a net worth of $380,507.00, Gabbert's 1981 and 1982 income tax 
returns showing an annual gross income in excess of $100,000.00, and a proforma on the 
Newton Dairy. (Ex. 8P, 9P, 10P, IIP) The proforma showed a reduced herd size for the 
months of September and October 1983 indicating that the cows would be carefully 
selected and purchased over a period of two to three months. (Ex. IIP; Tr. 1541) 
Gabbert's financial statement included a second home valued at approximately 
$90,000.00 with an estimated $38,000.00 mortgage. (Ex. 8P) The home is located at 217 
East 3100 South on Bountiful's East bench. The home is of all brick construction and 
sits on a large corner lot. (Ex. 12P) 
The Loan Committee approved the loan subject to the condition that Gabbert 
either show a $50,000.00 investment in dairy cows or give the Bank a second mortgage 
on his Bountiful home. (Tr. 213, 218) Gabbert agreed to pledge the Bountiful property 
as additional security. (Tr. 214) 
West was chairman of the loan committee. (Tr. 214, 532) He testified that 
Heslop's loan documentation was typical for the type of loan being made. (Tr. 535) 
When Heslop informed West that the additional collateral met the Loan Committee's 
condition, West instructed Heslop to commit on the loan. Heslop asked if he should wait 
for the Bank's in-house appraisal on the Bountiful property, and West said no. Heslop 
also asked if the loan should be presented to the Loan Committee again, and West said 
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it would not be necessary because Gabbert met the committee's condition. (Tr. 214, 218, 
463, 524-525, 1536) 
Browning testified at his deposition in 1988 that he and Timmons knew, in 1983, 
that the Gabbert loan had Loan Committee approval. At trial, Browning did not recall 
whether he knew, in 1983, that the loan had Loan Committee approval. (Tr. 1199-1200) 
Peacock and Kleyn understood, in 1983, that the Gabbert loan had Loan Committee 
approval. (Tr. 669-670, 764-765) 
Heslop committed the Bank to make the Gabbert loan. (Tr. 214) Once 
committed, the Bank was legally obligated to make the loan. (Tr. 576) Only West 
initialled the loan approval report. (Tr. 555; Ex. 7P) 
In August 1983, the Bank was still in a transition period due to the reorganization. 
The Loan Committee was a new entity and members did not always initial every loan 
that was approved. Kleyn traveled to Europe in August 1983 for a three-week period 
and was not available to initial the loan approval report. (Tr. 575, 576, 761, 764, 796) 
The Gabbert loan did not even need Loan Committee approval. The Bank's 
written loan policy allowed officers to aggregate their lending authority. West's lending 
limit on a secured loan was $250,000.00, and Heslop's was $50,000.00, for an aggregate 
lending limit of $300,000.00. (Tr. 219, 526, 575, 794; Ex. 17P) 
On August 19, 1983, after Heslop had committed on the Gabbert loan, the Bank's 
appraiser, Ben Quinn, appraised the value of the Bountiful property at $45,000.00. The 
mortgage was approximately $33,000.00. Quinn had been instructed to make very 
conservative appraisals on real estate offered as security on Bank loans. He did not give 
a fair market value appraisal on the Bountiful property. (Ex. 7P, 12P; Tr. 215, 464, 577, 
733) 
At trial, the Bank's counsel suggested that the Loan Committee would only accept 
the Bountiful property as additional security if it had equity of $50,000.00. (Tr. 557) 
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Bank counsel also suggested that Gabbert had to place his $50,000.00 investment into an 
escrow account. (Tr. 434) Actually, neither of these conditions were placed on Heslop 
by the Loan Committee. (Ex. 7P; Tr. 433, 1289-1290, 1533-1534) Heslop was authorized 
to disburse the loan to Gabbert. The closing occurred on August 22, 1983. (Tr. 437-439; 
Ex. 7P) 
The second week in September 1983, Carlson, the Bank's Loan Review Officer, 
prepared a loan review and comment report on the Gabbert loan. The purpose of the 
loan review was to point out weaknesses so the loan could be strengthened. (Tr. 702, 
711, 713; Ex. 15P, 54D) The comment report was located on the reverse side of the loan 
review and consisted of a list of questions about the Gabbert loan. Carlson requested 
that Heslop promptly return the answers. (Tr. 714; Ex. 55D, 15P) He wanted the 
answers returned, along with additional documentation that Heslop may have possessed, 
so he could arrive at a credit rating on the loan. (Tr. 740) Carlson testified that 
sometimes it was appropriate to prepare loan documentation after the loan had been 
disbursed. (Tr. 755) Carlson never saw the loan review and comment report ("review") 
after giving it to his supervisor for delivery to Heslop. (Tr. 715, 741) 
Heslop received the review, answered the questions, and placed the document in 
inter-office mail for delivery back to Carlson. (Tr. 222-231) West later returned the 
review to Heslop after receiving it from Timmons. West said Timmons did not like some 
of Heslop's answers and wanted them changed. (Tr. 223) Heslop changed his answers 
and provided additional information to try to please Timmons. (Tr. 225) 
Two hundred ninety head of cattle had been purchased by the time Carlson 
performed his loan review. Heslop responded to Carlson's questions with the 
understanding that the dairy herd would be completed in two or three months. (Tr. 
1541; Ex. IIP) 
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Heslop's authority to administer the Gabbert loan was removed sometime 
between September 14 and September 29, 1983. (Tr. 221, 460-461, 768) A few months 
later the Bank renegotiated and recollateralized the loan. (Tr. 461-462, 769-770) 
On September 29, 1983, Heslop received a copy of a memorandum from 
Timmons to West which specifically removed all of Heslop's lending authority. The 
memorandum also generally limited loans at the Bank to $100,000.00 unless approved by 
Browning, Timmons or the Directors' Loan Committee. Heslop felt devastated by the 
memorandum. (Tr. 232-233; Ex. 16P) 
Timmons' memorandum falsely accused Heslop of violating the letter and spirit of 
the Bank's written loan policy in making the Gabbert loan. (Ex. 16P) The Gabbert loan 
did not violate Loan Policy No. 13. The loan was conditionally approved by the Loan 
Committee, and the condition was met. Repayment of the loan was not dependent solely 
upon the profitable future operation of the dairy. The cattle purchased with the loan 
and with Gabbert's investment were security for repayment of the loan. Gabbert's 
Bountiful home provided additional collateral, he also had a substantial income and other 
valuable assets. Repayment of the loan was not dependent solely upon the marketing of 
a growing crop or livestock. The loan could be repaid from milk proceeds, sale of cattle, 
or both. No other provision of Loan Policy No. 13 applied to the Gabbert loan. (Tr. 
234-238; Ex. 17P) 
No one told Heslop in 1983 which policy the Gabbert loan violated. No one 
mentioned Loan Policy No. 13. Carlson's review questioned the loan's consistency with 
Loan Policy No. 7. The Gabbert loan was made to a medical doctor for a tax shelter. 
Gabbert's personal financial statements contained at least as much information as the 
Bank's preprinted personal statement forms. The Bank did not enforce the requirement 
of advance review of supporting legal documentation by Bank counsel, especially when 
preprinted forms approved by the Bank's attorneys were used. The Gabbert loan did not 
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violate Loan Policy No. 7. The remaining loan policies contained in the policy manual 
did not apply to the Gabbert loan. (Tr. 238-241, 531, 719-720; Ex. 15P) 
After receiving the September 29 memorandum, West had a heated discussion 
with Timmons. He argued that the Gabbert loan did not violate loan policy and 
explained that he and the Loan Committee had approved the loan. West stated the 
specific reasons for approving the loan. In response, Timmons said the loan violated 
Bank policy, but did not identify the policy other than to say it was an agricultural loan. 
(Tr. 529-531) 
After reading Timmons' memorandum, Heslop requested three days vacation from 
his supervisor, Kleyn, to contemplate his response to the memorandum. Heslop said, "It 
looks like they're trying to force me out and if the Board of Directors doesn't protect me, 
I will probably have to quit." Heslop also said he had not resigned. When Kleyn saw the 
memorandum, he was very sympathetic with Heslop and allowed the vacation leave. (Tr. 
242,249) 
The revocation of all lending authority was particularly severe for Heslop because 
he had a lot of clients requesting small loans who would wait for him in the lobby. If the 
client qualified, Heslop would immediately make the loan. (Tr. 796-797, 573) Heslop 
was never told that the September 29 memorandum was anything but a permanent 
revocation of his lending authority. (Ex. 16P; Tr. 1288, 1536) 
Heslop resolved to petition the Board of Directors for a hearing to rebut the false 
accusation that he violated loan policy. He sent a certified letter, dated October 3, 1983, 
to Browning and a copy by regular mail to each member of the Board of Directors. The 
letter conveyed his belief that he was being forced from the Bank and specifically 
requested a hearing. (Tr. 245-249; Ex. 20P) 
On October 4, 1983, Heslop received a telephone call at home from Kleyn. He 
said Timmons wanted Heslop to submit his resignation in writing. Heslop replied that he 
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had not resigned and inquired about his request for a hearing before the Board of 
Directors. Kleyn said the request had been denied. Heslop asked whether the Board of 
Directors or Timmons made that decision. Kleyn did not know. 
The next day, Heslop returned to the Bank and met with Kleyn. He wrote his 
letter of resignation and delivered it to Kleyn. The letter began, "At your request, I am 
submitting in writing my notice of resignation from the Bank of Utah . . .." (Tr. 249-251; 
Ex. 21P) Heslop was unaware that Timmons did not have authority from the Board of 
Directors to fire a Board-appointed Senior Vice President. (Tr. 1515-1519; Ex. 83P, 77D, 
78D) 
Kleyn and Timmons testified that they did not ask for Heslop's resignation. (Tr. 
775, 788-789, 1286) Yet, Kleyn could not recall other facts relating to Heslop's 
resignation due to the amount of time that had elapsed. (Tr. 776-777) Timmons 
testified that the events which occurred after he delivered his 9/29/83 memorandum were 
a little cloudy in his memory. (Tr. 1285) 
After Heslop returned home he received another call from Kleyn. He said the 
Board of Directors had consented to a hearing at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. 
On October 6, 1983, Heslop spoke before the full Board of Directors. (Tr. 252-
260; Ex. 22P) Some of the Directors were not aware that Heslop's resignation had been 
requested, and that he had been initially denied a hearing. (Tr. 258, 1352, 1454) Heslop 
requested a response to the issues raised in his 10/3/83 letter to the Directors. He said 
he was available for continued employment as long as the assignment was reasonable. 
(Tr. 257-258) 
After Heslop spoke, the Directors asked no questions and made no comments. 
Heslop later received a letter from the personnel manager dated October 6, 1983 which 
stated that Heslop resigned and the Board of Directors accepted the resignation. Heslop 
later confronted the personnel manager about these inaccurate statements in the letter. 
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Heslop's separation notice and final paycheck were dated October 5, 1983. (Tr. 258-266; 
Ex. 23P, 24P, 25P) 
The position of Agricultural Loan Specialist was never filled after Heslop's 
constructive discharge. He was the first and the last Agricultural Loan Specialist at the 
Bank. (Tr. 1211-1212) 
At trial, Dr. Lewis, an economist, testified that Heslop's damages from the 
constructive discharge totalled $256,024.00. (Tr. 939) There was also testimony that 
Heslop's damages may have been slightly less (Tr. 949) or slightly more (Tr. 954-956) 
than that figure. 
7. Termination of Employment Without Good Cause 
Heslop was never given advance notice that his lending authority could be revoked 
if he made a bad loan. (Tr. 267) Other Officers at the Bank made bad loans. (Tr. 820, 
1193-1195) For example, Packer made a loan of approximately $150,000.00 to The Ski 
Company at about the same time that the Gabbert loan was made. The loan went into 
default, and eventually bankruptcy, but Packer was not disciplined. (Tr. 618-619) In fact, 
other than Heslop, no lending officer at the Bank ever had his lending authority revoked 
because he made a bad loan, or even a loan that violated Bank policy. (Tr. 532-533, 617, 
671, 798, 875-876, 1208) 
Heslop had good rapport with his fellow employees and clientele. (Tr. 821-822, 
759) He was a good loan officer with a good loan/loss record. (Tr. 534, 821, 266-267; 
Ex. 26P) 
8. A Pattern of Wrongful Termination 
After Heslop's constructive discharge, other long-term Officers of the Bank were 
forced to resign, or terminated without good cause. In November 1983, West was 
demoted from Senior Vice President in charge of the credit division to Vice President 
and commercial loan officer. West's supervisor, Brad Beale (hereinafter "Beale"), who 
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was brought to the Bank from Illinois by Timmons, called him into his office about every 
other week and inquired if he was looking for other employment. West was encouraged 
to leave the Bank. After the demotion, Timmons ignored West's suggestions and ideas 
regarding management of the Bank. West resigned in January 1984. (Tr. 540-541; Ex. 
5P) 
Peacock was manager of the Bank's audit department. In September or October 
1983, Peacock was complimented on his good work by the Directors' Audit Committee. 
Later, Peacock delivered an annual review to Timmons that gave the audit department 
employees high ratings. Timmons told Peacock that the employees could not be 
performing that well and ordered him to reduce the ratings. Peacock complied but still 
indicated that the employees were performing well. On about November 30, 1983, 
Timmons called Peacock into his office. He said Peacock was not doing a good job as 
auditor. Timmons told Peacock he was being reassigned as a clerk in the accounting 
department under the supervision of an employee that Peacock trained. Peacock refused 
to accept the demotion and left the Bank the following day. (Tr. 676-679) 
One day in late October 1983, Carlson went to work at the Bank as usual. Beale 
called Carlson into the board room and told him that his services were no longer needed. 
He ordered Carlson to remove his personal belongings from the premises and never 
return or he would be arrested. Beale then escorted Carlson from the Bank. Carlson 
had done nothing wrong and received no prior warning of his impending discharge. (Tr. 
722-723) 
9. Rulings by the Trial Court 
Heslop testified at trial about the amount of his attorney fees in this case. He 
said he is obligated to pay forty percent (40%) of the amount received. (Tr. 280) 
Heslop's proposed Jury Instruction No. 18 instructed the jurors on both general and 
consequential damages, including attorney fees as an item of consequential damages. In 
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support of his request for consequential damages, Heslop's attorney cited to the trial 
court the cases of: Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); and Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). The trial court denied Heslop's request. The 
court's Jury Instruction No. 23 instructed the jurors that they could only award general 
damages in this case. (Tr. 1562-1566) The transcript of the court's ruling is attached 
hereto as Addendum L. 
The trial court dismissed Heslop's cause of action for violation of public policy 
primarily because Berube uses very restrictive language in defining the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. (Tr. 1148-1151) After the ruling, Heslop's 
counsel asked the court to make a statement to the jury that the public policy exception 
was no longer an issue in the case. The court reviewed its proposed statement with 
counsel in chambers before delivering it to the jury. The statement informed the jurors 
that dismissal of the public policy issue did not affect the remaining issues in the case. 
The Bank's counsel approved the content of the statement in its entirety and without 
correction. Counsel did not ask the court to inform the jury that evidence relating to the 
accrual problem was not relevant to the constructive discharge and implied-in-fact 
contract issues. (Tr. 1262-1266) Likewise, counsel did not request a jury instruction or 
do anything else to support the argument they now make that the court should have 
given such an instruction. (Tr. 1566-1570) 
The trial court acknowledged that the total sum of payments to PMM looked 
curious and strange. (Tr. 1122, 1129) The court requested an explanation from the 
Bank's counsel for the large amount paid to PMM. (Tr. 1126-1129) Counsel failed to 
provide documentary evidence in support of, or a reasonable explanation for, the large 
sum. Furthermore, the Bank's counsel did not object to the testimony regarding the 
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payments to PMM. Only when Heslop's counsel offered the checks into evidence was an 
objection made. 
The trial court appropriately restricted the arguments that Heslop's counsel could 
make relating to the payments to PMM and Timmons' hiring and salary. (Tr. 1164-1165) 
Heslop's counsel's misstatement of Draughon's testimony during closing argument 
related to a minor issue in the case. The trial court instructed the jury that argument by 
counsel is not evidence (R. 605, 608) and that the verdict had to be based upon the 
evidence. (R. 611-612) Heslop's counsel prefaced his closing argument about 
Draughon's testimony with the statement, ". . . Mr. Draughon's testimony, as I recall it . . 
..'* (Tr. 1655) 
The main theme of Heslop's counsel's closing argument was that Heslop believed 
his conduct, in opposing the method chosen to resolve the accrual problem, was proper, 
honest, and in the Bank's best interest. He suffered for this belief. Heslop's counsel did 
not argue, or infer, that all other Officers and Directors of the Bank were criminals. (Tr. 
63-64, 1607-1609, 1655, 1657-1658, 1661) 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The trial court properly denied the bank's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
1. The jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence that Heslop 
was constructively discharged. Heslop had a history of promotion and favorable 
treatment at the Bank until November 1981. He fell from favor because he opposed the 
Bank's method of resolving the accrual problem. Heslop curried additional disfavor 
because he voluntarily met with the Attorney General in September 1982. His personal 
notes were deceptively taken by Bank counsel who were trying to end the Attorney 
General's investigation. The Bank enlisted the aid of Timmons, a supposedly independent 
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auditor, to end the investigation. Timmons was then hired as Bank President. Heslop 
opposed Timmons' hiring. In January 1983, Timmons demoted Heslop to Agricultural 
Loan Specialist and then instituted a policy that the Bank would make no agricultural 
loans. In September 1983, Heslop was falsely accused of violating loan policy and his 
lending authority was revoked. In October 1983, Timmons requested Heslop's written 
resignation. Heslop unsuccessfully petitioned the Board of Directors for relief. 
The evidence presented by Heslop at trial on the constructive discharge 
issue was sufficient to meet the legal standard set forth in Jury Instruction Nos. 15 and 
16. Arguably, the legal standard that actually applies in Utah is less stringent. 
Cases cited by the Bank in support of its argument that Heslop was not 
constructively discharged are distinguishable from this case. 
2. The jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence that Heslop 
had an implied-in-fact contract with the Bank terminable only for good cause. The 
employment application signed by new employees at the Bank did not rise to the dignity 
of an employment contract. Even if Heslop's application form were construed as an 
express, integrated employment contract, that agreement terminated when Heslop quit in 
1959. A majority of the witnesses at trial testified that the Bank's policy was to terminate 
employment only for just cause. The jury considered this evidence more persuasive than 
the Bank's evidence of an at-will employment policy. 
3. The jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence that the Bank 
terminated Heslop's employment without good cause. Heslop was a good loan officer 
with a good loan/loss record. The Gabbert loan was not good cause to terminate his 
employment. 
Any negative criticism of Bank management by Heslop was exclusively 
contained within his personal notes. His notes were kept confidential until the Bank 
deceptively obtained them during the Attorney General's investigation. 
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4. The Bank failed to meet its affirmative obligation to marshall all the 
evidence supporting the jury verdict and then show the evidence cannot support the 
verdict. The Bank's Brief does nothing more than reargue the same points raised at trial. 
B. The trial court properly denied the Bank's motion for a new trial. 
1. The evidence at trial regarding the accrual account problem, 
investigations of the Bank, hiring of Timmons, payments to PMM, wash entries, and 
terminations of other employees was relevant to Heslop's case and the danger of unfair 
prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value. These events occurred within 
two years of Heslop's wrongful discharge from the Bank. 
The accrual problem caused a change in Heslop's relationship with his 
employer. The wash entries, investigations, and PMM audit were relevant to show the 
correctness of Heslop's opposition to the Bank's method of resolving the accrual 
problem. During the Attorney General's investigation, Heslop's superiors were angry 
because he voluntarily met with the Attorney General. Timmons' hiring corresponded 
with a decline in Heslop's responsibility at the Bank. Timmons' remuneration and the 
payments to PMM related to the Bank's claim of financial difficulty. The wrongful 
terminations of other employees supported the argument that Heslop was constructively 
discharged. 
2. After the trial court dismissed Heslop's public policy claim, the 
accrual problem was still relevant to the issues of good cause and constructive discharge. 
Facts relating to an implied-in-fact contract terminable only for just cause were remote in 
time and unrelated to the accrual problem. 
3. Browning's failure to request Heslop's resignation in January 1983 
did not preclude any causal connection between prior events and Heslop's wrongful 
termination in October 1983. The accrual problem was still relevant to show the abrupt 
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change in Heslop's relationship with his employer. Moreover, Browning may have just 
waited for a more opportune time. 
4. The misstatement of Draughon's testimony by Heslop's counsel 
during closing argument was harmless error. The misstatement caused no significant 
difference in the outcome of the trial. The Bank's counsel failed to object to the 
misstatement. 
C The general rule is that a court's decision states the true nature of the law, 
both retrospectively and prospectively. The Be rube opinion contained no statement that 
it applied prospectively only. The Bank has not shown that it justifiably relied on the 
employment-at-will doctrine in terminating Heslop's employment. 
D. Heslop was promised employment at the Bank until he retired, unless there 
was good cause to terminate. He did not have a contract of employment to age 65, or 
for any other specific period of time. Since Heslop's employment contract could have 
been terminated within one year, it did not fall within the Statute of Frauds. 
E. The trial court was aware of the Beck and Be rube cases but refused to 
instruct the jury on consequential damages, including attorney fees. The court should 
have allowed such an instruction. 
F. This court has recently regressed from its long-held position that all 
contracts contain an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Brehany 
v. Nordstrom decision should be vacated and this court should recognize an implied-in-
law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment contracts. 
G. A large majority of the jurisdictions in the United States recognize the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Very few of these 
jurisdictions have held that the public policy exception sounds in contract. 
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The purpose of the public policy exception is to prevent employers from 
discharging employees for cause "morally wrong". Contract damages may not deter 
employers from committing this most egregious form of wrongful discharge. 
H. The Bank's decision to resolve the accrual problem over time placed 
Heslop in jeopardy of being charged with a third-degree felony. His opposition to the 
Bank's decision set in motion the events that ultimately caused his wrongful discharge. 
The public policy exception identified in Be rube should extend to employees, like Heslop, 
who are wrongfully terminated for encouraging their employers to comply with the law. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE BANK'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
"A J.N.O.V. can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). On appeal, this court 
applies the following standard of review to the trial court's denial of the Bank's Motion 
for J.N.O.V.: "[W]e reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict." Id. See also Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982); Winters v. 
W.S. Hatch Co.. Inc., 546 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1976). "The burden on an appellant to 
establish that the evidence does not support the jury's verdict and the factual findings 
implicit in that verdict under such a circumstance is quite heavy." Cambelt Intern. Corp. 
v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). 
In Mel Hardman Prod. Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979), this court 
stated: 
As we have numerous times indicated, the right of trial by jury is one which 
should be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party had 
demanded such a trial, he is entitled to have the benefit of the jury's 
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findings on issues of fact; and it is not the trial court's prerogative to 
disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own. Therefore, in 
ruling on motions which take issues of fact from the jury (this includes both 
motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict), 
the trial court is obligated to look at the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the 
party moved against; and the granting of such a motion is justified only if, 
in so viewing the evidence, there is no substantial basis therein which would 
support a verdict in his favor. On appeal, in considering the trial court's 
granting of such motions, we look at the evidence in the same manner. 
604 P.2d at 917. Point I of the Bank's Argument must fail because there was sufficient 
evidence introduced at trial to support the jury's verdict. 
Point I A. of the Bank's Argument is essentially an assertion that the trial court 
abused its discretion by allowing the jury to consider irrelevant and prejudicial evidence 
that prevented a fair trial. The assertions in Point I A lend no support to the argument 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. These arguments are 
more appropriately made exclusively within Point II B. Accordingly, Heslop's reply to 
Point II B. will also respond to the assertions contained in Point I A 
1. The Jury Verdict was Supported by Sufficient Evidence that Heslop 
was Constructively Discharged 
From his rehire in 1962 to November 1981, Heslop had an uninterrupted history 
of promotion and favorable treatment at the Bank. That all changed, however, when he 
took a strong stand in opposition to the Bank's method of resolving the accrual problem. 
Beutler threatened Heslop's job. (Tr. 137-138, 332-334) Browning and Kunz, the two 
most influential members of the Board of Directors, were contemptuous of Heslop for 
exposing the accrual problem. (Tr. 856-857) The evidence plainly indicates that by 
December 1981, Heslop had fallen from favor and his career had begun moving in 
reverse. 
In September 1982, Kunz was angry at Heslop because he voluntarily met with the 
Attorney General. (Tr. 157-158, 479) Heslop's notes, which contained his personal 
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criticism of the Bank, were deceptively taken by Bank counsel in October 1982. (Ex. 
39P) In January 1983, Heslop was demoted to the position of Agricultural Loan 
Specialist and soon afterward the Bank instituted a verbal policy against making 
agricultural loans. (Tr. 125-126, 191) 
In September 1983, Heslop was falsely accused of violating loan policy and his 
lending authority was revoked. (Ex. 16P) In October 1983, Timmons requested Heslop's 
written resignation. (Tr. 249-251; Ex. 21P) 
The foregoing facts are sufficient to support the jury verdict on constructive 
discharge, and meet the legal standards set forth in Instructions 15 and 16. Even if the 
jurors believed that Heslop was not asked to submit his written resignation, there was still 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on constructive discharge. The jurors 
could have reasonably concluded that the Bank was trying to force Heslop to resign. 
Even if that was not the Bank's intent, however, it could still be found liable for 
constructive discharge. "[A]n employer may merely have intended to make life 
unpleasant for his employee, yet be found liable for constructive discharge, if the 
reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer's conduct was to cause the employee to 
quit." Colman v. Wavne State University. 664 F. Supp. 1082, 1092 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
The revocation of all lending authority was particularly humiliating for Heslop 
because of the types of loans that he made and the long-standing relationships that he 
had with his clients. (Tr. 796-797, 573) Heslop was a loan officer. The total revocation 
of his lending authority would be analogous to telling a judge that he or she could not 
make a decision but could perform all other judicial functions. 
In Zilmer v. Carnation Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal. App.2d Dist. 1989), Zilmer 
was discharged after 31 years of employment during which he rose from the position of 
office management trainee to division controller of the largest division in the company. 
One year before the discharge, supervisors Pate and Adams reorganized the accounting 
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department. They informed Zilmer that he had to obtain a certified management 
accountant certificate as a precondition to further employment with the company. 
Zilmer said he did not believe he could obtain the certificate due to added 
responsibilities and work requirements. The supervisors informed him that no exceptions 
would be made to this requirement. 
After Zilmer's discharge, defendant hired non-certificated employees and relieved 
existing employees of the obligation. Zilmer's complaint alleged that the supervisors' 
representations were false and intended to create intolerable working conditions, thus 
forcing Zilmer's resignation. The scheme was part of a plan to replace high-level 
managerial personnel with associates and friends of Adams from Price Waterhouse, 
where he was formerly employed. The court held that Zilmer stated a claim for 
constructive discharge. 
Several long-term employees of the Bank were wrongfully discharged by Timmons 
soon after Heslop left. The jurors could have reasonably concluded that Timmons was 
trying to force the resignations of long-term managerial personnel at the Bank for his 
own benefit. Without the support of influential directors like Browning and Kunz, 
Heslop had no chance of survival at the Bank. 
In Real v. Cont'l Group, Inc.. 627 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1986), the plaintiff 
began work for Continental in 1950. He received numerous promotions and pay 
increases until he reached the position of manager of industrial engineering for 
Continental's Pacific Division, a Grade E-15 position. In 1981 Real was demoted five 
grades to the position of supervisor of industrial engineering as a result of a 
reorganization at Continental. His salary and benefits, however, did not change. Real 
was denied the position of manager of industrial engineering for the newly-created 
Western Division. 
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In 1982 the company reorganized again and Real's position as supervisor of 
industrial engineering was eliminated. He was offered a Grade E-ll position at another 
plant, but without relocation benefits. Real declined the offer. Real was denied the 
position of supervisor of quality control at the nearby San Jose plant, but was eventually 
offered the Grade E-6 position of plant buyer at that location. Real would have retained 
his previous salary and benefits. However, rather than accept a nine-grade demotion, he 
left Continental. At trial, the jury found that Continental constructively discharged Real. 
Continental's Motion for J.N.O.V. argued that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the jury verdict of constructive discharge. In denying Continental's Motion the court said, 
"[TJhere was a sufficient basis for the jury to find that a reasonable person in Mr. Real's 
position would have felt compelled to resign when he did." 627 F. Supp. at 443 The 
court added: 
Mr. Real's career at Continental was moving in reverse with no apparent 
hope of any advancement at the time he left the company in February 
1982. . . . Continental makes much of the fact that despite the plaintiffs 
demotion and job offers graded substantially below the job he held prior to 
June 1981, Mr. Real suffered no reduction in his salary or benefits. This 
fact alone is not enough to defeat the jury's finding of constructive 
discharge, [citation omitted] 
Id. The Bank's argument that Heslop was not demoted because he retained his same 
salary is not persuasive. Heslop's career was certainly moving in reverse with no 
apparent hope of advancement. 
Although the evidence of constructive discharge in this case met the legal 
standards contained in Instruction Nos. 15 and 16, arguably the applicable legal standard 
in Utah for constructive discharge is less stringent. In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 
340 (10th Cir. 1986), the court noted a divergence of opinion among the circuits as to the 
findings necessary to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge. Some courts apply a 
subjective standard by requiring the employee to prove the employer's specific intent to 
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force him to leave. Other courts have adopted an objective standard requiring the 
employee to prove that the employer has made working conditions so difficult that a 
reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to resign. Id. at 343. 
In Derr the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals unqualifiedly adopted the objective standard. 
Contra Bratcher v. Skv Chefs, Inc., 308 Or. 501, 783 P.2d 4 (1989). 
In Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792, Fn. 5 (Utah 1979), this court said that 
an employer can constructively discharge an employee if the employer's words and 
actions "logically lead a prudent man to believe his tenure has been terminated." This 
language suggests an objective standard. Heslop's counsel took exception to Instruction 
Nos. 15 and 16 insofar as they exceeded the scope of the objective legal standard for 
constructive discharge identified in Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra and Bihlmaier v. 
Carson, supra. (Tr. 1666-1669; R. 619-620) 
In Spulak v. K-Mart Corp.. 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990), the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Spulak on his claim of constructive discharge. Spulak was employed 
with K-Mart for almost 11 years. In 1985, K-Mart restructured and Spulak came under 
the supervision of Price, the new district manager. Price instigated an investigation of 
Spulak and he was subsequently accused of violating company policy for using the store's 
back door, failing to sign in and out properly, using improper invoicing procedures, and 
paying for merchandise after taking it from the store. Spulak presented evidence that 
the alleged violations were either approved or condoned by the store manager. Price 
gave Spulak the option of retiring or being fired and Spulak submitted his resignation. 
Later, Price issued a written reprimand to Spulak which advised him that he would be 
fired in the future if he committed additional infractions. Spulak's March 27 resignation 
was not effective until May 1, 1985. In the interim, Spulak asked Price if he could keep 
his job. Allegedly, Price said he would find another way to terminate Spulak's 
employment if he tried to withdraw his retirement. Price denied making that statement. 
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In affirming the denial of K-Mart's motion for J.N.O.V., the court said the 
evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Spulak resigned because of 
unreasonably harsh conditions and an ultimatum either to retire or be fired. The court 
cited to Bristow v. Daily Press. Inc.. 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) for the 
proposition that "an employee is protected from a calculated effort to pressure him into 
resignation through the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess of those 
faced by his co-workers." 894 F.2d at 1154. 
The Bank placed unreasonably harsh conditions on Heslop. He was placed in the 
dead-end position of Agricultural Loan Specialist. The Bank then instituted a policy 
against making agricultural loans. When that failed to force his resignation, Timmons 
falsely accused Heslop of violating loan policy and revoked his lending authority. No 
other employee had ever been mistreated in this manner. Heslop still declined to resign 
and resolved to petition the Board of Directors for relief. Timmons then asked for 
Heslop's written resignation. In those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt 
compelled to resign from the Bank. 
The cases cited by the Bank in support of its argument that Heslop was not 
constructively discharged are distinguishable from this case. In Flanagan v. McKesson 
Corp.. 708 F. Supp. 1287 (N.D. Ga. 1988) [Bank Brief at p. 50], the employee was 
demoted, but instead of reporting to his new position he immediately resigned because 
he found the demotion humiliating. Heslop, on the other hand, was demoted in January 
1983, but continued to work for the Bank until October 1983. Even after he was falsely 
accused of violating loan policy and had his lending authority revoked, he still did not 
resign. Instead, he resolved to petition the Board of Directors for relief so he could 
continue his employment. Heslop did not submit his resignation until Timmons 
requested it in writing. The revocation of Heslop's lending authority was not a transfer 
to a new position. 
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Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1987) [Bank Brief at p. 50] 
was a Title VII action based on racial discrimination. In such a case the plaintiff must 
show some aggravating factors such as a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment. 
A single isolated instance of discrimination is insufficient to show differential treatment. 
This requirement, as explained by the court, "is predicated on the notion that Title VII 
policies are best served when the parties, if possible, attack discrimination within the 
context of their existing employment relationships." 823 F.2d at 361. The requirement to 
show a pattern of discriminatory treatment does not apply to the case sub judice. 
The court in Watson also said that "the determination whether conditions were so 
intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a reasonable employee's decision to resign is 
normally a factual question left to the trier of fact." 823 F.2d at 361. The question of 
whether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee's decision to 
resign is the same standard that applies in this case. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra: 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, supra. 
In Knee v. School Dist. No. 139 in Canyon Cty.. 106 Id. 152, 676 P.2d 727 (Id. 
App. 1984) [Bank Brief at p. 52], the plaintiff, unlike Heslop, had an express three-year 
contract that could only be terminated for limited, specific reasons. Knee, a school 
superintendent, was asked by the school board for his resignation. Since the board 
members gave no reason for their request, as far as Knee knew the board was merely 
requesting his resignation and lacked the power to dismiss him. Yet, Knee voluntarily 
gave his resignation. "Furthermore, at no time did Knee request reinstatement or 
otherwise seek reconsideration of the board's action." 676 P.2d at 730. 
Heslop did not have an express contract identifying the specific ways that he could 
be terminated. He did not know whether Timmons had authority to fire a Board-
appointed Senior Vice President. Unlike Knee, Heslop sought reinstatement through his 
petition to the Board of Directors. 
43 
In Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1989) [Bank Brief at p. 53], 
the plaintiffs only supporting evidence actually provided no support for her position. 
Heslop's testimony relating to constructive discharge was supported by documentary 
evidence, and testimony by other ex-employees as to the unreasonable and 
unprecedented measures taken by the Bank. 
In Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Corners of Cty. of Adams. 703 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1985) 
[Bank Brief at p. 53], Wilson protested her assignment as backup receptionist. When her 
employer refused to relieve her of the responsibility, she left her job and refused to 
return. When her leave expired, she was given an ultimatum to return to work or be 
terminated. Wilson failed to return. 
Heslop continued to work at the Bank after his demotion to Agricultural Loan 
Specialist. After the revocation of his lending authority, Heslop took three days of 
vacation leave that was approved by his supervisor. The revocation of Heslop's lending 
authority was pretextual and punitive in nature, whereas Wilson's responsibility as backup 
receptionist was a legitimate assignment within the scope of her job description. Wilson 
refused to return to work. Heslop desperately tried to obtain a reasonable assignment at 
the Bank. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals commented upon the Wilson decision in Price v. 
Boulder Valley School D. R-2. 782 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1989). 
Although analysis of constructive discharge does not turn upon the 
subjective view of the individual employee, consideration of the condition of 
the particular employee may be appropriate to determine the existence of 
deliberate employer actions, [citation omitted] Moreover, the central 
concept in the definition of constructive discharge is involuntariness on the 
part of the employee in resigning, [citation omitted] Thus, while it would 
appear that Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, supra, requires an exclusively 
objective analysis, we conclude that the theory of constructive discharge 
countenances consideration of factors peculiar to the particular employee 
and the circumstances of his work to determine the larger question of 
whether the employee's resignation was voluntary. 
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782 P.2d at 824. Heslop's actions prior to, and after, submitting his written resignation 
show that his resignation from the Bank was involuntary. 
In Christie v. San Miguel Cty. School DisL. 759 P.2d 779 (Colo. App. 1988) [Bank 
Brief at p. 54], the plaintiff was a school teacher with an express contract of employment. 
She knew that her job was protected by statute and that only the school board could 
terminate her employment. Christie's school district was authorized to reassign her 
duties by virtue of the state's "Tenure Act". When the district made such a reassignment, 
Christie resigned. Christie failed to produce evidence that her working conditions were 
intolerable. 
The revocation of Heslop's lending authority on the pretext that he violated Bank 
policy amounted to harassment and coercion sufficient to make his working conditions 
intolerable. The Bank believes that Heslop should have acquiesced to Timmons' 
harassment indefinitely. But Heslop had been a lending officer for over 20 years and 
understood better than anyone the effect of Timmons' order on his job. The order was 
especially severe for Heslop because of the types of loans he made and the long-term 
relationships he had with his clients. (Tr. 796-797, 573) Heslop's petition to the Board 
of Directors was an appropriate and reasonable response to Timmons' harassment. 
Adams v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 776 P.2d 639 (Utah App. 1989) [Bank 
Brief at p. 55] was an administrative case in which the employee claimed he was 
constructively discharged. The central issue was whether he voluntarily left work without 
good cause. The employee refused to work for a couple of weeks on the night shift after 
being requested to do so by his employer. When the employer refused to let the 
employee work days, the employee quit. The court upheld the Board of Review's 
findings that the employee severed the employment relationship. 
In another administrative case, Dept. of Air Force v. Dept. of Emp. Sec. 786 P.2d 
1361 (Utah App. 1990), the court upheld the administrative finding of constructive 
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discharge where the employer initiated the separation with a notice of proposed removal. 
The employee then resigned. In the case sub judice, the Bank initiated the separation by 
revoking Heslop's lending authority and then requesting his written resignation. 
In Lombardo v. Oppenheimer, 701 F. Supp. 29 (D. Conn. 1987) [Bank Brief at p. 
56], the plaintiff was one of four employees whose job assignment was changed based on 
a reasonable business decision by the employer. All four were treated identically. 
Heslop, however, was treated differently than other employees. No other lending officer 
at the Bank ever had his lending authority revoked because he made a bad loan, or even 
one that violated Bank policy. (Tr. 532-533, 617, 671, 798, 875-876, 1208) 
In Lombardo, the court noted: 
Here, plaintiff does not allege facts that suggest verbal abuse by defendants 
(such as threatening to fire her or giving her ultimatums). She does not 
allege any decrease in salary or benefit, or that defendants were overly 
critical of her work, or that she was wrongly accused or disciplined for 
making mistakes. Plaintiff merely claims she was treated coldly. Her 
treatment, though potentially unpleasant, was not significantly offensive and 
is insufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge. 
[emphasis added] 701 F. Supp. at 32. Heslop's job was not only threatened, but he was 
actually asked to resign. He was also wrongly accused of violating Bank policy. 
In both Neale v. Dillon, 534 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) [Bank Brief at p. 57] 
and Finstad v. Montana Power Co., 241 Mont. 10, 785 P.2d 1372 (1990) [Bank Brief at 
p. 58], the plaintiffs resigned because they did not want to accept job transfers. In Neale, 
the court noted, "In this case, transfers from one bureau to another were frequent; most 
ADAs (Assistant District Attorneys) had experienced several." Neale's primary concern 
was her loss of prestige from the transfer to a non-supervisory position in the appeals 
bureau. 534 F. Supp. at 1390. 
Finstad resigned instead of accepting a transfer to Butte because he wanted to 
stay in Cutbank for one more year so his youngest son could graduate from high school. 
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Also, Finstad disliked the fact that the move to Butte would require him to drive longer 
distances. 785 P.2d at 1374-1375. 
Heslop did not resign because he was transferred. After Heslop's demotion to 
Agricultural Loan Specialist and transfer to the Bank's Ogden office, he continued to 
work for the Bank for another nine months. In late September 1983, Heslop's lending 
authority was revoked, but he was not transferred. 
2. The Jury Verdict was Supported by Sufficient Evidence that Heslop 
had an Implied-in-Fact Contract with the Bank Terminable Only for 
Good Cause 
The Bank's argument that Heslop signed an express, integrated employment 
contract which made him an employee at will, overlooks three important facts. 1) The 
employment application signed by Heslop in 1955 was not an employment contract; 2) 
Heslop quit his employment with the Bank in 1959; and 3) Heslop did not sign an 
employment contract at the time of his rehire in 1962. 
In McLain v. Great American Ins. Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1481 
(1989), McLain completed and signed an application form before starting work for Great 
American. The application form contained an employment at-will clause. The trial court 
looked at several factors in determining that the application form was not an integrated 
employment contract. First, the application form did not contain an integration clause. 
Second, the application was a standardized two-page form. Third, the application was 
brief and informal. Fourth, the application did not cover important aspects of the 
employment relationship such as salary and position. Finally, the application was a 
pre-printed form drafted solely by the employer. 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868. See also Stone 
v. Mission Bay Mortg. Co.. 672 P.2d 629 (Nev. 1983). 
The foregoing factors apply to Heslop's application form and support the 
argument that the application did not rise to the dignity of an employment contract. 
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(Information regarding Heslop's salary and position were added to the application after 
Heslop's hiring on March 20, 1955.) (Ex. IP) 
Even if Heslop's application form were construed as an express, integrated 
employment contract, that agreement terminated when Heslop quit in 1959. See Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
If the Bank wants to argue, in the alternative, that the application forms are 
simply evidence that the Bank's policy was employment-at-will, it must consider that the 
jurors found the opposing evidence more persuasive. 
In Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank. 261 Cal. Rptr. 185, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1217 
(1989), Wilkerson and his employer did not reduce their employment relationship to an 
integrated writing. Wells Fargo's employee handbook and service operations manual, 
however, both contained at-will provisions. The court held that "rather than being 
controlling, the employee handbook and SOM are factors to be considered by the jury in 
determining the existence and content of the employment agreement." 261 Cal. Rptr. at 
191. 
Heslop, West, Packer, Beutler, Carlson, Kleyn, Peacock and even the Bank's own 
witness, Kennedy, all long-term employees of the Bank, testified that the Bank's policy 
was to terminate only for just cause. (Tr. 118-120, 506-508, 572, 620, 676, 698, 704, 1364) 
Heslop was told of the Bank's policy to terminate employment only for good cause at the 
time of his rehire in 1962. West, Packer and Peacock testified that the employment 
application was not an accurate representation of the termination policy that actually 
existed at the Bank. (Tr. 545, 572, 642, 676, 698) Several of the witnesses recalled that 
the just-cause policy was expressly stated or inferred in meetings or discussions at the 
Bank. (Tr. 545, 642, 702-703) 
This case was tried in 1990. Many of the witnesses were asked to recall events 
that occurred 10, 20 or even 30 years before. The Bank's argument that the testimony of 
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these witnesses is insufficient to support the jury verdict, because some could not 
remember the specific conversation in which the specific statement was made that the 
Bank's policy was to terminate only for just cause, is irrational and attempts to place an 
undue burden on Heslop. 
In Richards v. Detroit Free Press, 173 Mich. App. 256, 433 N.W.2d 320 (1988), 
the court reversed the trial court's grant of J.N.O.V. on plaintiffs claim for wrongful 
discharge. The court held: 
In this case, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for the jury to properly 
infer that he had a legitimate expectation that he could only be demoted 
for just cause. Plaintiff testified to many conversations with management 
personnel where he and other supervisors were told that they would have 
their jobs as long as they "kept their noses clean." . . . Plaintiff also 
testified that he and other supervisors attended a seminar on supervisory 
techniques at which the just-cause discharge policy was explained to them. 
433 N.W.2d at 322. 
In Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, "Wilkerson offered the deposition 
testimony of two bank officers, Cha Sanders and Ronald Schneider, and the declaration 
of Griffith, a former executive vice president of the bank, each of whom stated the bank 
had a policy to terminate employees only for good cause." 261 Cal. Rptr. at 189. 
In the case sub judice, the Bank tried to legally bind its employees to an at-will 
provision in the application form. Afterward it promised seniority, advancement, and 
termination only for just cause to encourage the employees to work harder and remain 
loyal to the Bank. This double standard is precisely the type of employee abuse that 
inspired the implied-in-fact contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. "An 
employer is bound by statements of policy made after the employee is hired because the 
employer derives benefits from a loyal and cooperative work force." Richards v. Detroit 
Free Press, supra at 322 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan. 408 
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)). 
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The Bank received the benefit of its bargain. Heslop was a loyal and dedicated 
employee for over 20 years. He worked hard, and made the Bank a lot of money. 
Ironically, the Bank denied Heslop the benefit of his bargain by reneging on its promise 
to discharge only for good cause. 
3. The Jury Verdict was Supported by Sufficient Evidence that the 
Bank Terminated Heslop's Employment Without Good Cause 
The testimony at trial indicated that Heslop was a good loan officer with a good 
loan/loss record. (Tr. 534, 821, 266-267; Ex. 26P) The Gabbert loan was not good cause 
to terminate his employment. Heslop presented evidence that he was not guilty of 
misconduct in making the Gabbert loan. In 1983, Heslop, West, Peacock, Kleyn and 
possibly Browning and Timmons knew that the Gabbert loan had Loan Committee 
approval. (Tr. 218, 525, 669-670, 764-765, 1199-1200) 
In Whitlock v. Hanev Seed Co., 114 Id. 628, 759 P.2d 919 (Id. App. 1988), the 
court held there was substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that 
Whitlock was fired without good cause. 
The company claimed that Whitlock had made capital expenditures without 
prior approval, that he had used company personnel to care for his lawn, 
and that he was "stripping" trucks which the company had decided to sell. 
However, Whitlock presented evidence that the capital expenditures were 
approved and that the "stripping" of trucks actually consisted of removing 
his own personal property as well as changing the tires and wheels at the 
request of his superiors. Finally, Whitlock presented evidence that it was a 
known practice in the company for some managers to have company 
personnel perform lawn care at their homes. The jury chose to accept 
Whitlock's version of events. 
759 P.2d at 923. 
In this case, the jury apparently believed that either Heslop was not guilty of 
misconduct in making the Gabbert loan, or discharging an employee with over 20 years 
of experience for making one bad loan or even one loan in violation of Bank policy was 
without good cause. 
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Any negative criticism of Bank management by Heslop was exclusively contained 
within his personal notes. Heslop kept his personal notes confidential until the Bank 
deceptively and unethically persuaded him to surrender them. Heslop did constructively 
criticize Bank actions, particularly in November and December 1981. Many businesses 
actually approve of constructive criticism as a means of self-improvement. Had Bank 
management been more receptive to Heslop's constructive criticism, the accrual problem 
and subsequent investigations of the Bank may have been avoided. 
There was substantial evidence presented at trial that Heslop was a dedicated and 
loyal employee of the Bank. Heslop's October 3, 1983 letter to the Board of Directors 
and October 6, 1983 statement to the Directors reflect his continuing loyalty and concern 
for the Bank's success. (Ex. 20P, 22P) 
"If an employer claims the employee was discharged for specific misconduct, and 
the employee denies the charge, the question of whether the misconduct occurred is one 
of fact for the jury." Wilkerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra at 192-193. 
4. The Bank Failed to Marshall all the Evidence Supporting the 
Verdict, Therefore, this Court Need not Consider the Challenge to 
its Sufficiency 
In order to challenge the jury verdict in this case on the basis of insufficiency of 
the evidence, the Bank '"must marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict' and then 
show that the evidence cannot support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart, supra at 17. 
(citing Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 
1986); Cambelt Intern. Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987) (quoting Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985)); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985)). These cases place an affirmative obligation on the Bank to marshall 
the evidence supporting the jury verdict. This requirement was brought to the Bank's 
attention in Heslop's response to the Bank's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
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Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial. (R. 1088) The Bank's Brief fails to meet 
this obligation because it does nothing more than reargue the same points raised at trial. 
In State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990), Moore also vigorously 
urged essentially the same points raised at trial. Moore's was a criminal case, however, 
the Utah Court of Appeals explained that the marshalling-of-the-evidence requirement 
applies to civil jury trials Mwhere the appellate courts are even more deferential, and view 
the evidence and all possible inferences, in a light most favorable to the jury verdict." 
802 P.2d at 739. The court gave the following reasons for the marshalling requirement: 
The process of marshalling the evidence serves the important function of 
reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the 
fact finder at trial. Such deference is especially appropriate where the fact 
finder is a jury, whose common sense is a valued buffer between the 
parties. We believe that this deference is appropriate and important in 
both civil and criminal cases. Marshalling also aids the appellate courts in 
deliberations and in the opinion-writing process. 
Id. 
This court need not consider the Bank's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence because the Bank has not complied with the "marshalling" requirement. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE BANK'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
A trial court has some discretion in deciding whether or not to grant a new trial, 
and this court will reverse only when that discretion is abused. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 
P.2d at 17. "However, the trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial unless the 
moving party shows at least one of the circumstances specified in Rule 59(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultra Systems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 
(Utah App. 1988)). Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P. is subject to the provisions of Rule 61 U.R.C.P. 
A copy of Rule 61 is attached hereto as Addendum M. This rule places upon an 
appellant "the burden of showing not only that an error occurred, but that it was 
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substantial and prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived in some manner of a full 
and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 
787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 
1987)). 
When parties have been given an opportunity to present their claims to a jury in a 
fair trial and a verdict and judgment are entered, all presumptions are in favor of the 
validity of the verdict and judgment. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saint Hosp., 348 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1960). The Bank has failed to show at least one of the circumstances 
specified in Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P. Moreover, the Bank received a fair trial. 
1. Evidence at Trial 
The evidence at trial regarding the accrual account problem, investigations of the 
Bank, hiring of Timmons, payments to PMM, wash entries, and terminations of other 
employees was relevant to Heslop's case and the danger of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value. See Rules 401, 403 U.R.E. All these events 
occurred within a period of less than two years from the date of Heslop's wrongful 
discharge from the Bank. 
The Bank filed a Motion in Limine on April 23, 1990, seeking to exclude evidence 
of the accrual problem and the investigations. The trial court had ample time to 
consider the Bank's Motion. The matter was argued on May 30, 1990 and the trial court 
signed an Order dated June 13, 1990 denying the Bank's Motion on the ground that 
neither Rule 401 nor Rule 403 U.R.E. would be a proper basis for excluding the 
evidence. (R. 409, 488) 
Evidence of the accrual problem was relevant to show the change in Heslop's 
relationship with his superiors. Prior to November 1981, the owners, directors, and 
managers of the Bank were supportive of Heslop. Afterward, they were covertly and, at 
times, overtly hostile toward him. 
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Evidence of the wash entries, investigation by the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions, and the audit of the Bank by PMM was relevant to show the correctness of 
Heslop's position in opposing the Bank's method of resolving the accrual problem. 
Heslop's loss of support from the owners, directors, and managers of the Bank was 
unjustifiable and unreasonable. 
Facts relating to the Attorney General investigation were relevant to show that 
some Directors were angry with Heslop because of his willingness to cooperate with the 
Attorney General. (Tr. 157-158, 479) Also, Timmons told the Attorney General that the 
accrual problem was caused by the ignorance of Heslop and other Bank officers. (Tr. 
182, 1326) This self-serving statement, and the effect that it had in abating the 
investigation by the Attorney General, may have promoted Timmons' rise and Heslop's 
fall at the Bank. 
During the Attorney General's investigation, the Bank's attorneys deceptively 
persuaded Heslop to surrender his personal notes. (Tr. 166-169) The notes contained 
statements of Heslop's opinion that Browning and Kunz may have found offensive. The 
termination of Heslop's employment may have been based, at least in part, on the 
content of his personal notes. 
In Heller v. Champion Intern. Corp., 891 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), Heller was 
wrongfully discharged from his employment because he made tape recordings of 
conversations with his supervisor. At trial, the jury found that Heller had an implied-in-
fact employment contract that Champion breached by firing Heller without good cause. 
The trial court granted Champion's Motion for J.N.O.V. on the ground that Heller's tape 
recording of meetings with his superiors was good cause to terminate as a matter of law. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the entry of J.N.O.V. was improper and 
reversed the trial court for invading the province of the jury to determine questions of 
fact. 
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Early in this case, another district court judge denied two requests by Heslop for 
information regarding Timmons' remuneration as President of the Bank. (R. 52, 61-62, 
66-67) The trial judge denied Heslop access to this information until its relevance could 
be determined after hearing the evidence at trial. The court ruled at trial that the 
evidence was admissible. (R. 485-486; Tr. 1165) Timmons' remuneration and the Bank's 
payments to PMM were relevant evidence because the Bank argued that it was 
experiencing financial difficulty and "had to become lean and mean to survive." The 
Bank implied that Heslop was demoted to Agricultural Loan Specialist as a cost-saving 
measure. (Tr. 101) Yet, at the same time, the Bank contracted to pay exorbitant salary, 
bonus, and benefits to Timmons; and exorbitant payments to PMM. The Bank also 
constructed a lavish office in Salt Lake City for Timmons. 
Out of the presence of the jurors, Heslop's counsel explained to the court two 
additional theories about the relevance of Timmons' hiring and the payments to PMM. 
The Bank's Brief conveniently fails to mention the second "and more likely scenario." 
(Tr. 1156-1158) The Bank devised a strategy to use Timmons, supposedly an 
independent auditor, to intercede in the Attorney General's investigation of the Bank. 
Browning and the Directors of the Bank became indebted to Timmons after he was 
successful in abating the Attorney General's investigation. Timmons was rewarded 
monetarily, his prestige was enhanced with PMM, and he was given inordinate power at 
the Bank. Timmons opportunistically used his power to wrongfully discharge long-term 
employees who had been promised termination only for good cause. He replaced them 
with friends or left the position vacant. 
Admittedly, this additional theory is based on circumstantial evidence. But 
circumstantial evidence can be relevant evidence. "Also, it is not to be expected in cases 
of this type that a plaintiff would necessarily discover documentary or other direct 
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evidence in support of his claim." Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 777 
P.2d 371, 376 (1989). 
Evidence that other long-term employees were discharged at about the same time, 
and under similar circumstances was relevant to Heslop's claim of constructive discharge. 
Furthermore, the evidence was relevant to show the bias of these witnesses. (Tr. 538-539) 
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990) was a "slip and 
fall" case. Prior to trial, Wasatch made a Motion in Limine to exclude the testimony of 
three potential witnesses who had also slipped and fallen on Wasatch's property. The 
trial court granted the Motion subject to the condition that the evidence would be 
admitted if shown to be relevant at trial. 
On the last day of trial, Erickson presented evidence that the three prior falls 
occurred within a year of Erickson's fall, and in the same location. The trial court ruled 
that evidence of the three prior falls was relevant and admissible. The jury returned a 
verdict for Erickson and the trial court denied Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial. The 
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the testimony regarding prior falls was 
admissible because the falls occurred in the same time period and under similar 
conditions. 
In Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., supra, the trial court allowed two former K-Mart 
employees to testify about the circumstances under which they left their employment. 
On appeal, K-Mart argued that the relevance of this evidence was outweighed by its 
prejudice under F.R.E. 403. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the former 
employees worked in the same state as Spulak, were fired within a very short time after 
Spulak left K-Mart, and were wrongfully fired under circumstances similar to Spulak's 
discharge. The court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 894 F.2d at 1156, 
Fn. 2. 
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None of the evidence introduced at trial was unfairly prejudicial to the Bank. The 
evidence did not provoke the jury to punish the Bank. The testimony at trial indicated 
that Heslop's damages amounted to $256,024.00. The actual figure may have been 
slightly more or slightly less. (Tr. 939, 949, 954-956) Yet, the jury only awarded Heslop 
$160,000.00. Had the jurors been inclined to punish the Bank, they likely would have 
awarded the amount of damages requested by Heslop, or more. 
In Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985) [Bank Brief at p. 66], the 
evidence of alcohol-induced debility was highly indefinite and inconclusive. There was no 
evidence that the decedent showed any signs of a hangover during the day. His vigorous 
activity in waterskiing was inconsistent with any impairment. "While Evan's character was 
not on trial, it became an issue after the unbridled admission of testimony of Evan's 
illegal purchase and consumption of alcohol." 701 P.2d at 494. The jury found the 
decedent's negligence to be the sole proximate cause of his death. 
In the case sub judice, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the jurors 
improperly focused their attention on the accrual account problem, the investigations of 
the Bank, the hiring of Timmons, payments to PMM, the wash entries, and the 
terminations of other employees; and thereby determined that Heslop had an implied-in-
fact employment contract terminable only for good cause. The jurors may have 
considered this evidence in finding that Heslop was constructively discharged without 
good cause because it is relevant to those issues. 
The Bank has no factual support for its argument that it would have obtained a 
more favorable result had the court excluded this evidence. The jury could have still 
reached the same verdict based on the remaining evidence in the case. Exclusion of this 
evidence would have been unfairly prejudicial to Heslop's case. "A trial court's 
determination to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned in the absence of an 
57 
abuse of discretion." Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc. at 530 (citing Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985)). 
2. Statement to the Jury 
The facts relating to the implied-in-fact contract issue were remote in time and 
unrelated to the "Public Policy" facts. Evidence of the accrual problem and investigations 
was relevant to the issue of constructive discharge. When the trial judge dismissed 
Heslop's public policy claim, he said this evidence was relevant to the "good cause" issue. 
He did not say that it was not relevant to the constructive discharge issue. (Tr. 1263-
1264) The judge made this statement early in the trial. Later, he recognized that 
evidence of the accrual problem and investigations was also relevant to the issue of 
constructive discharge. (R. 1183) An instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence of 
the accrual problem and investigations in considering the constructive discharge and 
implied-in-fact contract issues would have been unfairly prejudicial to Heslop's case and 
would have impinged on the jury's right to apply the facts to the issues in the case. 
During closing argument, the Bank's counsel had an opportunity to fully explain the 
Bank's view of how the facts applied to the issues in the case. 
In Almonte v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1983) [Bank Brief 
at p. 65], the testimony of Angelo Almonte was inflammatory and also irrelevant to all 
issues in the case other than bad faith. When the court directed a verdict for defendant 
on the bad faith claim, it should have instructed the jury to disregard the bad faith 
evidence. Unlike Angelo Almonte's testimony regarding bad faith, the evidence relating 
to Heslop's public policy claim was also relevant to the issues of constructive discharge 
and good cause. 
3. Browning's Failure to Request Heslop's Resignation 
In January 1983, Heslop asked if Browning wanted him to resign. Browning 
replied that he thought Heslop should stay. The Bank argues that this was an 
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intervening act that precludes any causal connection between prior events and the 
termination of Heslop's employment in October 1983. The trial court did not accept this 
myopic view of the facts because he understood that the accrual problem was relevant to 
show the abrupt change in Heslop's relationship with his employer. (Tr. 1263-1264) 
Moreover, Browning explained that he did not ask Heslop to resign in January 1983 
because he wanted to avoid the turnover in key personnel at a critical time for the Bank. 
(Tr. 998-999) 
A large majority of the witnesses at trial testified that the Bank's personnel policy 
was to terminate employment only for good cause. The Bank also had a seniority 
system. Browning and Kunz would have known of these promises that the Bank made to 
its employees. 
Heslop lost support from Browning and Kunz because he exposed the accrual 
problem and opposed the Bank's method of resolving it over time. The Bank's method 
of resolving the accrual problem caused the investigations of the Bank. The investigation 
by the Department of Financial Institutions resulted in an order that PMM audit the 
Bank. Timmons would never have become President of the Bank had he not supervised 
the PMM audit. Timmons demoted Heslop to Agricultural Loan Specialist and initiated 
the policy against making agricultural loans. He revoked Heslop's lending authority and 
ultimately requested his resignation. Browning and Kunz at least acquiesced in Timmons' 
wrongful discharge of Heslop. The chemistry necessary to cause constructive discharges 
of long-term employees of the Bank may have been incomplete without the "Timmons" 
ingredient. 
The reductions in force at the Bank in 1983 were not intervening events that 
precluded the relevance of prior events. Heslop had over 20 years of seniority. The 
reduction in force at the Bank in the spring of 1983 was small and the reduction in force 
in October 1983 occurred after Heslop's wrongful discharge. (Tr. 1067-1068) 
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4. Closing Argument 
The misstatement of Draughon's testimony by Heslop's counsel during closing 
argument was harmless error. If the mistake not been made, there would have been no 
significant difference in the outcome of the trial. The misstatement related to the minor 
issue of whether Browning lied about his knowledge of the accrual problem. There were 
many such inferences at trial. Beutler's testimony alone made numerous inferences that 
Browning was untruthful on this point. Furthermore, the Bank's counsel failed to object 
to the misstatement. 
After two weeks of trial by jury, it is difficult even for experienced counsel to 
remember all the evidence, especially on minor issues. Additionally, Heslop's testimony 
conflicted with Draughon's testimony on the substance of Browning's and Kunz' 
statements to Draughon. (Tr. 177-178) 
In Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981), the court 
affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial. Plaintiff contended 
that the mention of her past medical treatment prevented her from having a fair trial. 
The court stated: 
Because his position allows him to hear the remarks of the attorneys and 
the witnesses, view the jury, and observe the general mood in the 
courtroom, the trial judge is the one especially well-suited to evaluate 
whether this rather brief and perhaps inadvertent mention of the earlier 
bypass operation affected the jury. The fact that plaintiffs medical record, 
including four references to the bypass operation, had been admitted into 
evidence without objection is an additional indication that the mention of 
the bypass operation did not prevent plaintiff from having a fair trial. 
635 P.2d at 102. Donahue v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 
1987) [Bank Brief at p. 67] involves a fact situation significantly different than this case. 
First, defendant's counsel objected to the misstatements made by plaintiffs counsel 
during closing argument. Second, plaintiffs counsel insinuated that the defendant had 
been unwilling to settle the case. Third, the jury rendered an inflated verdict. Finally, 
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the trial judge, who is also the trial judge in this case, granted the defendant's Motion for 
a New Trial. 
In Dist. of Columbia v. Bethel 567 A.2d 1331 (D.C. App. 1990), the court noted: 
As the Supreme Court explained in a case decided in the last century, "if 
every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a 
reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of 
advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel 
are occasionally carried away by this temptation." 
567 A.2d 1337 (citing Dunlop v. United States. 165 U.S. 486, 498 17 S. Ct. 375, 379, 41 L. 
Ed. 799 (1897)). 
5. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The jury verdict in this case was supported by sufficient evidence. See VI A. 
above. Hansen v. Stewart, supra. 
C THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BERUBE 
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
In Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), this court declared the Utah Guest 
Statute unconstitutional. The defendants in the case petitioned for a rehearing, 
contending that the decision should have applied prospectively only. The court noted 
that "the general rule from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to 
state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively. . . . In the vast 
majority of cases, a decision is effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even an 
overruling decision." [citations omitted] 693 P.2d at 676. 
The Malan decision overruled the state's long-standing Guest Statute. Berube v. 
Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) did not overrule the employment-at-will 
doctrine but merely created two exceptions to the doctrine. The Malan court explained: 
Whether the general rule should be departed from depends on whether a 
substantial injustice would otherwise occur. . . . We may, in our discretion, 
prohibit retroactive operation where the "overruled law has been justifiably 
relied upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden." [citations 
omitted] 
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Id- The court inferred that in Utah, cases that have been given only prospective 
application usually involve the invalidation or reinterpretation of statutes. The Berube 
case did not involve a statute, but an archaic rule of common law with "questionable 
foundations." 771 P.2d at 1040. In Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984), the court held that the decision applied prospectively only. Even then, 
however, the court allowed the decision to apply retroactively to the six plaintiffs who 
were parties to the appeal. 691 P.2d at 196. 
In cases where this court has applied a decision prospectively only, the court 
included a statement to that effect in the same opinion. See, e.g., Rio Algom Corp. v. 
San Juan County, supra; Timpanogos Planning and Water Mgmt. v. Central Utah Water 
Conservancy Dist, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984). The Berube case contained no statement 
that the decision applied prospectively only. 
The Bank's claim that it relied upon the employment-at-will rule to obtain 
summary judgment in the Beutler lawsuit is bogus. That decision was based on the 
Unclean Hands doctrine. Furthermore, Beutler filed suit while Heslop was still at the 
Bank. Thus, the Bank was on notice it may be sued if it wrongfully discharged an 
employee. 
The employment-at-will doctrine has been in a state of flux in the United States 
for the past decade. The Bank's attorneys knew of this situation, as evidenced by their 
defense to the Beutler lawsuit. The Bank has made no legitimate showing that it 
justifiably relied on the employment-at-will doctrine in terminating Heslop's employment. 
In Malan, the court stated, "Our ruling was also founded on the changing use of 
the automobile in light of current conditions and clear-cut illogical discriminations that 
make the statute blatantly unfair." 693 P.2d at 677. The Berube decision was founded 
on the questionable background of the employment-at-will doctrine in light of changing 
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employment conditions in an information-age society and illogical discriminations that 
create unreasonably harsh results and make the doctrine blatantly unfair. 
The injustice that would result if employees who were wrongfully terminated prior 
to Be rube are barred from a remedy far outweighs any prejudice to the Bank. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS DID NOT BAR HESLOP'S CLAIM OF 
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT. 
Heslop was promised employment at the Bank until he retired, unless there was 
good cause to terminate. The Bank's counsel asked Heslop if he intended to work to age 
65. Heslop responded, "That was the standard, the expected age of retirement then, yes." 
(Tr. 293-296) 
The Bank now tries to extrapolate from Heslop's testimony the argument that he 
had a verbal contract of employment for the specific period of 33 years. The record 
indicates that Heslop was actually promised employment "until retirement." 
In Hodge v. Evans Financial Corp., 823 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1987), Hodge, like 
Heslop, had a contract for permanent employment. The defendant argued that because 
the agreement contemplated employment over a number of years, the statute of frauds 
required it to be in writing to be enforceable. The court explained: 
[T]he statute has long been construed narrowly and literally. . . . [I]t 
applies only to those contracts whose performance could not possibly or 
conceivably be completed within one year. . . . [A]ny contingent event 
could complete the terms of the contract within one year. 
823 F.2d at 561-562 (citing Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 130, Comment a (1979); 2 
Corbin on Contracts § 445 at 542-543 (1950 and Supp. 1984); and 3 Williston on 
Contracts, § 495 at 577-583, (3rd Ed. I960)). The court noted, "The vast majority of the 
state courts faced with this issue have squarely and unequivocally held that contracts such 
as Hodge's fall outside the statute." 23 F.2d at 562, Fn. 2 (see Footnote 2 for a long list 
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of authorities). The court agreed with Hodge's argument that his death could constitute 
a contingent event that would complete the terms of the contract within one year. 
In Cowdrev v. AT. Transport, 367 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. App. 1985), the court 
identified two other contingent events that could complete the terms of the contract 
within otie year. "The company could have terminated its operations or plaintiff could 
have performed so poorly that defendant would have had just cause to discharge him 
within one year." 367 N.W.2d at 434. 
Defendant's counsel asked Hodge "'if he had formed an intention as to how long 
[he] planned to work.'" Hodge replied, "'I really questioned if I was going to go much 
beyond 65.'" 823 F.2d at 564, Fn. 5. The defendant then argued on appeal that Hodge's 
contract was for a definite period of 11 years. Id. The court said, "The applicability of 
the statute of frauds does not depend on the expectations of the parties." 823 F.2d at 
564. See also Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.. 520 A2d 208, 213 (Conn. 1987) (The 
enforceability of a contract under the one-year provision does not turn on the actual 
course of subsequent events, nor on the expectations of the parties as to the 
probabilities.) 
The court concluded that "Hodge was merely stating his expectation as to how 
long he intended to continue working." 823 F.2d at 564, fn. 5. Heslop was also merely 
stating his expectation that he would work until retirement, which he believed would 
occur when he reached age 65. 
The fact that Hodge expected to retire at some point does not mean that 
his contract could not possibly be performed within one year. All 
employment contracts of permanent, lifetime or indefinite duration 
undoubtedly contemplate retirement; such contracts certainly do not, as a 
matter of law, mean that the employees are bound to work until the day 
they drop dead. 
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823 F.2d at 564. See also Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co.. 766 P.2d 280, 283 (N.M. 1988); 
Robards v. Gavlord Bros.. Inc.. 854 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988). The court held that 
Hodge's permanent employment contract was not barred by the statute of frauds. 
In Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co.. supra, the parties' oral employment 
contract for a period "not less than one year1' included a 30-day probationary period. 
The court held that the employment contract could have been terminated within one 
year because of the probationary period, therefore, it did not fall within the statute of 
frauds. 672 P.2d at 630-631. 
Heslop's oral contract of employment also included a 90-day probationary period 
that he successfully completed. During the probationary period, however, Heslop's 
employment could have been terminated by the Bank. Moreover, Heslop's case is 
stronger because his contract was for employment until retirement, not for a period "not 
less than one year". 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON AN AWARD OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The trial court denied Heslop's request for a jury instruction on consequential 
damages, including attorney fees as an item of consequential damages. In Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), this court held that in an action for 
breach of an implied contract against a first-party insurer, a successful plaintiff could 
recover both general and consequential damages. Consequential damages are "those 
reasonably within the contemplation, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time 
the contract was made." 701 P.2d at 801. "The foreseeability of any such damages will 
always hinge upon the nature and language of the contract and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties." 701 P.2d at 802 (citing J. Calamari & J. Perillo. Contracts. § 
14-5 at 523-525 (2d Ed. 1977)). 
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The Beck court envisioned "a broad range of recoverable damages" in such a case 
because "an insured frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available 
within a reasonable period of time to cover an insured loss." Id. The consequences 
faced by an employee who is wrongfully discharged are analogous to those encountered 
by an insured in a breach of implied contract case. The employee usually experiences a 
substantial or even total loss of income and may lose additional assets in an effort to 
cover living expenses. Moreover, the employee must pay attorney fees to redress the 
employer's wrongdoing. 
In Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l American Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 
1988), this court announced, in dicta, that attorneys fees could be considered an element 
of consequential damages in a breach-of-implied-contract case involving a first-party 
insurer. This dicta was later applied to the holding in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). "Canyon Country's claim for recovery of fees was predicated 
on the theory that attorneys fees were an item of consequential damages flowing from 
the insurer's breach of contract." 781 P.2d at 420. Like Heslop, Canyon Country entered 
into a contingency fee agreement with its attorney. Canyon Country's attorney, however, 
sought "reasonable" fees instead of the contractual amount. The court specifically stated 
that attorneys fees as an item of consequential damages is a legitimate theory of 
damages. "However, attorney fees recovered as damages in a breach of contract suit 
must be based on the prevailing party's actual loss, i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses for 
legal counsel." Id- The court held that Canyon Country was entitled to attorney fees "in 
the amount of 1/3 of the amount ultimately recovered, as provided for in its attorney fees 
agreement." Id. 
In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., supra, a majority of the justices on the court 
held that "Beck" damages apply in a breach of implied-in-fact employment contract case. 
771 P.2d at 1050, 1053. 
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Be rube stated the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively. 
Malan v. Lewis, supra. The Bank promised to employ Heslop until retirement, unless 
there was good cause to terminate. Heslop expected to work at the Bank until 
retirement. It was reasonably foreseeable that Heslop would incur attorney fees to 
recover his damages if the Bank terminated his employment without good cause. 
The trial court read the Beck and Canyon Country Store cases at trial. (Tr. 1562) 
The trial court was also aware of the Be rube decision. Yet, the trial court still refused to 
allow an instruction to the jury on consequential damages, including attorney fees as an 
item of consequential damages. The trial court should have allowed such an instruction. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE BANK SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON HESLOP'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF 
AN IMPLIED-IN-LAW COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING. 
For over 15 years, this court consistently held that all contracts contain an implied-
in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g.. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985); Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd.. 618 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1980); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975); and State 
Automobile Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury. 494 P.2d 529 (Utah 1972). See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-203, Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 205 (1981). 
The court first began to backpedal from that position in Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd. where a majority of the court failed to recognize an implied-in-law covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in a contract for employment at will. In Berube. Justice 
Zimmerman stated, "Until we have had a better opportunity to consider the minimum 
rights and obligations that inhere in the employment relationship, as we did in Beck with 
respect to first-party contracts of insurance, I would reject invitations to create this cause 
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of action [breach of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing]." Be rube 
at 1052. 
During the preparation of this Brief, the court filed its opinion in St. Benedict's 
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital No. 890449 (Utah May 6, 1991). The St 
Benedict's opinion noted the court's regression from its earlier position on the implied-in-
law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "In this state, a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing inheres in most if not all contractual relationships." [emphasis added] St 
Benedict's. Slip Opinion at 7. Be rube was the lone, glaring exception cited by the court. 
Ten days later, the court's backpedaling reached full speed in Brehany v. 
Nordstrom. Inc., No. 20590 (Utah May 16, 1991). The jury awarded Brehany and her 
co-plaintiffs $285,000.00 on their cause of action for breach of an implied-in-law covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court, relying on this court's prior, consistent 
statements that all contracts contain such a covenant, denied Nordstrom's motions for 
directed verdict, new trial, and J.N.O.V. On appeal, this court held that "the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury that it could find for the plaintiffs on the basis of a breach of 
an implied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Brehany. Slip Opinion at 9. 
This writer respectfully begs to differ with the decision of the court in Brehany v. 
Nordstrom. One justification given by the court for its refusal to recognize the implied 
covenant in an indefinite-term employment contract is that the purpose and function of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognized in all contracts is different 
than the purpose and function of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment contracts. The distinction is illusory. The court explained, "Under the 
implied covenant of good faith applied in Resource Management the parties to a 
contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract should be construed in a 
manner which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created by the 
contract should be performed and exercised in good faith." Brehany. Slip Opinion at 8. 
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The court presented no evidence to suggest, however, that the parties to an employment 
contract intend, or should be deemed to intend, anything less. 
Another justification for the court's holding, and probably the lynch-pin of its 
argument, is that by implying a good faith covenant in an at-will employment contract, 
the court will create a good cause standard for all employers. The court stated, "The 
covenant of good faith recognized in Resource Management cannot be construed to 
change an indefinite-term, at-will employment contract into a contract that requires an 
employer to have good cause to justify a discharge." This writer agrees. However, the 
existence of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not lead, a 
fortiori, to the conclusion that employers can only terminate for good cause. 
Admittedly, the court may have been compelled to reach this non sequitur due to 
the plaintiffs overreaching in arguing that Resource Management requires an employer 
to discharge an indefinite-term employee only for good cause. 
Traditionally, the employment-at-will doctrine gave the employer freedom to 
terminate an at-will employee "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally 
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & Allegheny 
Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884) foverruled on other grounds! Hutton v. 
Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). The most troubling aspect of the doctrine 
is that portion which allows a termination "for cause morally wrong" or "in bad faith." 
The Brehany decision does not adequately address the bad faith issue. 
In Fortune v. Natl Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1971), the 
employer fired the plaintiff, a long-term employee, solely to prevent him from receiving 
the commission on a five million dollar ($5,000,000.00) sale on which his commission 
would have been over ninety thousand dollars ($90,000.00). Common sense dictates that 
an employee in that situation should have recourse through the legal system. 
Regrettably, however, under the Brehany decision, a Utah employee in the same 
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circumstance would have no cause of action, absent a showing of additional facts 
sufficient to fall under one of the other exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Rather than allow employers to terminate employment in bad faith, this court 
should adopt a holding which represents a reasonable compromise for employers and 
employees. The court in Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1981), 
adopted such a "middle ground" position. The court correctly noted that the absence of 
good cause to discharge an employee does not equate with the absence of good faith. 
The court explained: 
"Certainly good cause to discharge an employee would tend to negate the 
existence of bad faith in the decision to discharge an employee. But 
termination in the absence of good cause does not establish bad faith, and 
it is only a factor in determining whether there was fair dealing." 
429 N.E.2d at 26-27. Some courts have felt uncomfortable with the vague term "bad 
faith" and have, therefore, further defined it by holding that "any action by either party 
which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the employment contract is 
a violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . .." Metcalf v. 
Intermountain Gas Co.. 116 Id. 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989); f citing Wagenseller v. 
Scottsdale Memorial Hospital 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Foley v. Interactive 
Data Corp.. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (1988)). In Metcalf and 
Wagenseller. the courts held that a "no cause" termination did not breach the implied-in-
law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 778 P.2d at 749, 710 P.2d at 1040-1041. 
In Brehany. this court cites to Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp.. 58 N.Y.2d 
293, 304-305, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983). In Murphy. New York 
joined the very small minority of states in which the courts have left change in the 
employment-at-will doctrine to the legislature. 448 N.E.2d at 89. Utah, however, has 
joined the large majority of states in which the courts have recognized that the 
employment-at-will doctrine was created by judicial fiat and its harsh results should be 
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mitigated by the courts. See Be rube. Thus, in New York, "the law accords the employer 
an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time." 448 N.E.2d at 91. But in 
Utah, the law accords the employer only a rebuttable presumption that the employment 
is at will. Furthermore, Utah places a substantive limitation on the employer's right to 
discharge through an implied-in-law covenant that the employee will not be discharged in 
violation of public policy. Berube at 1051. In New York, it would be inconsistent to 
adhere to the concept of an unbridled employment-at-will doctrine and at the same time 
hold an employer to a just-cause standard. In Utah, however, the court has already 
created exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine and has placed substantive 
limitations on the employer's right to discharge. It would not, therefore, be inconsistent 
for the court to hold that the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
prevents an employer from discharging an employee in bad faith. 
In Murphy, Judge Meyer's dissent fairly summarizes the impetus' for the 
movement away from unrestricted application of the employment-at-will doctrine. He 
said: 
The harshness of a rule which permits an employer to discharge with 
impunity a 30-year employee one day before his pension vests (see United 
Steelworkers of America, Local Nos. 1617 v. General Fireproofing Co., 464 
F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1972); and Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 
822)) or for no other reason than that he filed a compensation claim (2A 
Larsen Workmens Compensation Law, § 68.36), the bizarre origin of the 
termination-at-will rule, the change of economic and constitutional 
philosophy that has occurred since its adoption, the exclusion of a 
substantial segment of the working community from its effects through "just 
cause" limitations upon the right to fire resulting from collective bargaining, 
and the inconsistency of the rule not only with the common law of England 
and with earlier New York decisions but also with the law of most 
industrialized countries of the world, have caused an outpouring of judicial 
and scholarly writings intended to ameliorate, if not abolish, the rule. 
448 N.E.2d at 93-94. The primary objective of the movement is to mitigate the harsh 
results of the doctrine through the legal process and thereby prevent the injustices that 
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employees have experienced for over 100 years. This point is completely missed by the 
court's opinion in Brehany. No consideration is given for an employee in a Fortune v. 
Nafl Cash Register Co. fact situation. Instead, the court focuses on, what should be a 
secondary concern, the protection of employer interests. 
In sum, this court should hold that the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, which exists in all contracts, including at-will employment contracts, is not 
breached if an employer terminates an employee for good cause, or for no cause, but is 
breached if any action by either party violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any 
benefit of the employment contract. In the alternative, the court should establish other 
factors for identifying a bad faith discharge or interpret bad faith on a case-by-case basis. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE BANK SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON HESLOP'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY, SOUNDING IN TORT. 
In Berube, Justices Durham and Stewart recognized the existence of a tort cause 
of action for violation of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
771 P.2d at 1042. Justice Zimmerman would measure the damages for violation of 
public policy by contract principles only. 771 P.2d at 1051. Justices Howe and Hall were 
silent on the issue. 
In Lowe v. Sorensen Research Co.. Inc., supra. Justice Zimmerman, writing for 
the court, noted that in Berube, f,We refused to recognize a variety of wrongful discharge 
actions sounding in tort." 779 P.2d at 670. 
In Peterson v. Browning, No. 400401 (Utah undecided). Honorable Thomas 
Greene of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division, 
certified the question of whether a public policy violation sounds in tort or contract to 
this court. No opinion has been rendered to date. 
This court apparently acknowledges that a clear majority of the jurisdictions in the 
United States recognize the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
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Hodge v. Gibson Prod. Co., 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 17 N. 7, P.2d 
(Utah 1991). Very few of the jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception 
have held that it sounds in contract. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kreiser's. Inc.. 433 N.W.2d 225 
(S.D. 1988); Sterling Drug Co. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); and Brockmeyer v. 
Dunn & Bradstreet. 113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). 
One explanation for the large number of jurisdictions that recognize a tort cause 
of action for violation of public policy is that these courts realize that contract damages 
may not deter employer misconduct. The purpose of the public policy exception is to 
prevent employers from discharging employees for cause "morally wrong". Without the 
threat of tort damages, some employers may simply accept the risk of suit and continue 
terminating employment in the most egregious of manners. In that case, society's efforts 
to stop this type of reprehensible behavior would be thwarted. 
Justice Zimmerman's inference in Berube that the imposition of "Beck" damages 
will solve the problem may work in theory but not in practice. 771 P.2d at 1051. Trial 
courts will be hesitant to award "soft damages", e.g., for mental anguish, under the Beck 
standard. Such damages, however, could conceivably be awarded in every applicable 
case under the tort standard. This case is a prime example that trial courts are hesitant 
to apply "Beck" damages. 
This court should hold that in Utah the cause of action for violation of public 
policy sounds in tort. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HESLOP'S CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, SOUNDING IN 
CONTRACT. 
The trial court in this case dismissed Heslop's cause of action for violation of 
public policy primarily because Berube states, "We will construe public policies narrowly 
and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial 
decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental that 
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there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public 
good." 771 P.2d at 1043. Admittedly, Heslop was not asked to prepare or sign false call 
reports. He was, however, a member of the OEC which recommended to the DEC that 
the accrual problem should be remedied over time. By resolving the problem over time, 
false entries were necessarily made in the Bank's accounts and false call reports were 
filed with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions. Heslop was in jeopardy of being 
charged with a third-degree felony because knowledge could have been imputed to him 
by virtue of his membership on the OEC. UCA § 7-1-318(1). 
The Bank deceptively obtained Heslop's personal notes during the Attorney 
General investigation in the fall of 1982. At least part of the reason for terminating 
Heslop's employment may have been the content of these notes. Heslop's personal notes 
were subpoenaed by Beutler in August 1983. Timmons likely reviewed Heslop's notes 
within a month of issuing his 9/29/83 memorandum revoking Heslop's lending authority. 
Furthermore, Heslop's compliance with the Beutler subpoena may have been another 
basis for his wrongful termination. 
The fact that Browning did not request Heslop's resignation during their meeting 
in January 1983 was another reason the court gave in dismissing Heslop's claim for 
violation of public policy. The trial court concluded that this was an intervening event 
that severed any causal relationship between prior events and Heslop's termination. 
Browning testified, however, that he did not request Heslop's resignation because he 
wanted to avoid the turnover in key personnel at a critical time for the Bank. (Tr. 
998-999, 1311-1312) Browning may have just been waiting for a more opportune time. 
The jury should have been allowed to decide whether any of the above-mentioned 
events constituted a violation of public policy. The problem confronting the trial court 
was accurately stated in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 
385 (1980). 
74 
The issue then becomes the familiar common-law problem of deciding 
where and how to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve the 
mandates of public policy and are actionable, and ordinary disputes 
between employee and employer that are not. We are mindful that courts 
should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion 
or to foment unwarranted litigation. We are, however, equally mindful that 
the myriad of employees without the bargaining power to command 
employment contracts for a definite term are entitled to a modicum of 
judicial protection when their conduct as good citizens is punished by their 
employers. 
427 A.2d at 387-388. In Berube, Justice Durham wrote, "Some courts have recognized 
that the nature and scope of 'substantial public policies' upon which the exception is 
based are not always so easily discerned. In fact, a precise definition of public policy may 
be virtually impossible." 771 P.2d at 1042. The solution to this problem is identified in 
Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co.. 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981). 
The existence of a "public policy" also calls for the type of multi-faceted 
balancing process that is properly left to the jury in most instances. The 
First Circuit Court, in the context of a negligence action, described the role 
the jury plays when reasonable persons could differ as to the inferences to 
be drawn from facts: "[I]t is deemed wise to obtain the judgment of the 
jury, reflecting as it does the earthy viewpoint of the common man-the 
prevalent sense of the community . . .." Marshall v. Nugent. 222 F.2d 604, 
611 (1st Cir. 1955). We believe it best to allow the citizenry, through the 
institution of the American jury, to strike the appropriate balance in these 
difficult cases. 
436 A.2d at 1145. In the case sub judice. the trial court made a last-minute decision to 
dismiss the public policy cause of action. The court should have resolved any doubt 
about whether to send the issue to the jury in Heslop's favor. 
In Wagner v. City of Globe. 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250 (1986), the plaintiff alleged 
that he was terminated from the police force because he refused to conceal the illegal 
arrest and detention of a Mr. Hicks. Wagner called the illegal arrest and detention to 
the attention of the police chief and city magistrate. Had Wagner acquiesced in the 
illegal detention, he may have been personally liable to Hicks. 
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The facts in Wagner are analogous to the facts in this case. Heslop asked 
questions about the accrual problem and called it to the attention of the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors. Heslop unwillingly risked being charged with a third-degree felony 
due to his position on the OEC. He proposed that the problem be resolved immediately 
and vehemently objected to the Bank's decision to correct the problem over time. 
The Wagner court identified four different factual patterns that have been 
collected under the same general rubric of "public policy." 722 P.2d at 256. The court 
concluded that the Wagner case fell in the "whistle-blower" category. In reversing the 
summary judgment for the employer, the court said: 
We believe that whistle-blowing activity which serves a public purpose 
should be protected. So long as employees' actions are not merely private 
or proprietary, but instead seek to further the public good, the decision to 
expose illegal or unsafe practices should be encouraged. 
722 P.2d at 257. Heslop's effort to have the Bank resolve the accrual problem with a 
one-time charge to undivided profits was in depositors' and the public's best interests. 
This fact gains greater significance when viewed in light of the recent turmoil in the 
banking and savings and loan industries in this country. 
In Johnson v. World Color Press. Inc.. 101 111. Dec. 251, 147 111. App. 3d 746, 498 
N.E.2d 575 (111. App. 5 Dist. 1986), the plaintiff was a senior vice president and chief 
financial officer of the defendant. Plaintiff claimed that he was discharged in retaliation 
for opposing certain accounting practices of the defendant which constituted violations of 
federal securities laws. The practices did not conform with generally-accepted accounting 
principles, the effect of which was to overstate the 1981 income of defendant. The court 
noted that Title 18, § 1001, United States Code "establishes a clearly mandated public 
policy against deceptive practices aimed at frustrating or impeding legitimate functions of 
government departments or agencies." 498 N.E.2d at 577-578. UCA § 7-1-318 also 
establishes such a public policy. "An employee with a reasonable belief that illegal 
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activity is occurring should be able to report his belief to his superiors in an effort to 
insure management's compliance with the law without fear of discharge." [citation 
omitted] 498 N.E.2d at 578. The court in Johnson concluded: 
In summary, we find that public policy favors full disclosure, truthfulness 
and accuracy in the financial reports made by businesses to the government 
and to the public, and that an employee who voices objection to practices 
which he reasonably believes violate this policy should be protected from 
being discharged as a result of such objection. 
Id. See also Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., supra (The plaintiff, a company accountant, was 
discharged solely because he prevented the defendant's president and chairman of the 
board of directors from converting defendant's property to his own personal use.); 
Delany v. Taco Time Int'l 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (Plaintiff was fired for 
refusing to sign a false and possibly tortious statement that cast aspersions on the work 
habits of a former employee.); and Harlis v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 
(W. Va. 1982) (Bank officer was temporarily demoted and then fired for reporting illegal 
bank practices to the board of directors and otherwise attempting to require the bank to 
comply with federal and state laws.). 
The fact that Heslop did not actually provide his personal notes and other 
evidence to the Attorney General or Department of Financial Institutions, and the fact 
that the Attorney General declined to prosecute the Bank or its Officers and Directors 
are not fatal to Heslop's claim of a public policy violation. See Johnston v. Del Mar 
Dist. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 771-772 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989); McOuary v. Belaire 
Convalescent Home, Inc., 69 Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21, 23, Fn. 5 (1984); Johnson v. 
World Color Press, Inc., supra at 578. 
This court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of Heslop's claim for violation 




Heslop respectfully requests this court to affirm the jury verdict and judgment of 
the trial court on his cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract of 
employment terminable only for good cause. Additionally, Heslop requests this court to 
remand the case to the trial court with instructions to award Heslop consequential 
damages in the amount of his attorney fees. 
If this court decides that Heslop's cause of action for violation of public policy 
sounds in tort, Heslop requests that the case be remanded for a determination of 
whether the Bank violated public policy and if so, what amount of additional damages 
Heslop incurred, and whether punitive damages should be awarded. 
DATED this day of June, 1991. 
RONALD E. GRIFFIN 
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslop 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee Ivan J. Heslop were hand-delivered this day of June, 1991, to: 
Glen C. Hanni, Esq. 
Stuart H. Schultz, Esq. 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
A. U.CA. Section 7-1-318. 
B. Order and Judgment dated July 10, 1989. 
C Partial Summary Judgment dated May 22, 1990. 
D. Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine dated June 13, 1990. 
E. Judgment on the Verdict dated August 27, 1990. 
F. Order dated October 16, 1990, Denying the Bank's Motion for J.N.O.V. or, in the 
alternative, for a New Trial. 
G. Heslop's Notice of Cross-Appeal dated November 21, 1990. 
H. Trial Transcript, Page 293, regarding Heslop's testimony that the Bank promised 
him employment until retirement, not for a fixed term. 
I. Trial Transcript, Page 296, showing that the Bank's counsel suggested Heslop 
intended to retire at age 65. 
J. Exhibit 39, Pages 11-16, Heslop's personal notes relating to his meetings with 
Bank counsel, Robert Moore, Wayne Black, and Paul Kunz. 
K. Exhibit 92, David Kunz billing statement for October 1982 relating to monitoring 
of Heslop and strategy to use Timmons to abate the Attorney General's 
investigation. 
L. Trial Transcript, Pages 1562, 1563, 1565 containing Heslop's argument for an 
instruction on consequential damages and the Court's denial of Heslop's request. 
M. Rule 61 U.R.C.P. 
ADDENDUM A 
7-1-318. Reports of condition — Minimum number re-
quired — Form — Verification — Publication — 
Falsification or failure to file. 
The commissioner shall make not less than two calls annually for report of 
condition upon each depository institution under the jurisdiction of the de-
partment. The report shall be made according to the form prescribed by the 
commissioner and shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the president 
or a vice president and attested by at least three directors. Except as provided 
in Chapter 9 with respect to publishing or mailing reports of credit unions, a 
copy of the report, duly certified by the commissioner, shall be published by 
the institution making the report in a newspaper having general circulation 
in the county where the principal office of the institution is located. Proof of 
publication shall be filed in the office of the commissioner within 30 days after 
the time of receipt by the institution of the copy certified by the commissioner. 
The commissioner may require a report of condition of any financial institu-
tion under the jurisdiction of the department whenever he considers it neces-
sary. 
(1) Any officer, director, or employee of a financial institution who 
knowingly subscribes or causes to be made any false statement or report 
to the commissioner or the supervisor having jurisdiction over that insti-
tution or any false entry in the books or accounts of the institution or 
knowingly subscribes or exhibits false papers with intent to deceive any 
person authorized to examine the institution or knowingly states or pub-
lishes any false report or statement of the institution is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree. 
(2) Every institution which fails or neglects to make a report within 30 
days after receipt of a call for any report required by the provisions of this 
title, an order of the commissioner, or any regulation of the department 
shall be subject to such penalty for each day's delay in transmitting such 
report as the commissioner may prescribe by regulation. 
(3) Every officer and employee of a financial institution under the ju-
risdiction of the department required by law to take an oath or affirma-
tion who wilfully swears falsely, is guilty of the criminal offense of per-
jury. 
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
Stuart H. Schultz #2886 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IVAN J, HESLOP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
banking corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No." CV-99381 
JUL 13 1989 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was heard by the 
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, on June 7, 1989. 
Glenn C. Hanni and Stuart H. Schultz of the law firm of Strong & 
Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and Ronald E. Griffin of 
the law firm of Freestone & Griffin appeared on behalf of 
plaintiff. The court, having considered the motion, memoranda, 
and pleadings, and further having considered oral argument of the 
parties, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Berube v. Fashion 
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Centre, Ltd, p.2d (Utah 1989), 104 U.A.R. 4, 
shall be applied retroactively to the claims involved in this 
case; 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to 
plaintiff's claims of breach of implied-in-fact contract and 
contractual wrongful discharge, including the claim of a public 
policy violation, is denied; 
3. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to 
plaintiff's fifth cause of action for tortious wrongful discharge 
is taken under advisement by the court, and the court reserves 
ruling on the issue of whether a claim by plaintiff of a public 
policy violation by defendant constitutes a tort claim or a 
contract claim until the time of pre-trial of the case, and the 
parties are allowed to submit briefs to the court on that issue 
prior to the pre-trial, all subject to any clarifying decision(s) 
issued by the Utah Supreme Court on this issue between the date 
of this order and the date of pre-trial; 
4. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all 
plaintiff's remaining causes of action is granted, and judgment 
dismissing said causes of action, with prejudice, on the merits, 
shall be entered. 
Pursuant to the foregoing order of the court, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
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1. That judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's second 
cause of action for promissory estoppel and plaintiff's third 
cause of action for breach of implied-in-law covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing on the grounds that such causes of action 
in the context of an employee's wrongful discharge claim are not 
recognized, as a matter of law, in the state of Utah; 
2. That judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's sixth 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to such cause of action and that reasonable persons 
could not differ on the conclusion that the undisputed facts show 
plaintiff has no cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and 
3. Plaintiff's second cause of action, third cause of 
action, and sixth cause of action are hereby dismissed, with 
prejudice, on the merits.
 (^\ /] 
DATED this M day of _e,> /1989. 
^ BY THE COURT 
Honorable David E. Roth 
District Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ronald E. Griffin" 
Freestone & Griffin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order and Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
day of June, 1989, to the following: 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Freestone & Griffin 
50 West 300 South #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 





Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
Stuart H. schultz #2886 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH. ttCA 
IVAN J- HESLOP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
banking corporation, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment with respect 
to plaintiff's fifth cause of action for tortious wrongful 
discharge was submitted for decision by the court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Neither party 
requested oral argument. 
The court having considered the motion and memoranda filed 
by defendant as well as the memorandum filed in opposition to the 
motion by plaintiff, and the court being advised in the premises, 
now, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
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respect to plaintifffs fifth cause of action for tortious 
wrongful discharge is granted on the grounds that under the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Lowe v. sorensen Research Co., Inc., 779 
P.2d 688 (Utah 1989), the public policy exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine is not the basis for a tort claim. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff dismissing plaintiff's fifth cause of action 
for tortious wrongful discharge, with prejudice, on the merits, 
no cause of action, including all claims for tort damages and 
punitive damages. 
3. If the Utah Supreme Court issues a decision before trial 
of this case which either clarifies or confuses the tort issue in 
the context of employment at-will claims, plaintiff may move for 
reconsideration of this decision. 
DATED this 2»Z^ day of May, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Partial summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, 
on May / , 1990, to the following: 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Freestone & Griffin 
50 West 300 South #900 




Ronald E. Griffin (4584) 
FREESTONE & GRIFFIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Bank Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IVAN J. HESLOP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANK OF UTAH, A Utah 
Banking Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion in Limine, dated April 20,1990, came before the court, pursuant 
to defendant's request for oral argument, on May 30, 1990, at 11:00 a.m. Defendant was 
represented by counsel, Glenn C. Hanni, and plaintiff was represented by counsel, Ronald 
E. Griffin. 
Defendant's motion sought an order precluding the admission of evidence of an 
accrual problem that occurred at the Bank of Utah in about 1981, and subsequent 
investigations by the Utah Department of Financial Institutions and Attorney General's 
Office that were conducted in 1982. Defendant's motion was based on rules 401 and 403 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS 
MOTION IN LIMINE ^ 
Case No. 87099381-CV 
Judge David E. Roth 
487 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The court having considered the motion and memoranda filed by defendant as well 
as the response filed by plaintiff, and having heard the arguments of respective counsel, and 
being advised in the premises, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion in Limine is denied on the grounds that the evidence 
defendant sought to exclude appears to the court to be relevant evidence, and neither rule 
401 nor rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence would be a proper basis for excluding said 
evidence. 
2. The court suggests that both counsel focus their examinations relating to the 
accrual problem and investigations in order to avoid any unnecessary delay in the 
presentation of this evidence at trial. 
Dated this 13 day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Roth 
Second District Court 
48S 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE was mailed this 7 day of June, 1990, to: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Stuart H. Schultz, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 




RONALD E. GRIFFIN (4584) 
FREESTONE & GRIFFIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Bank Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 3 22-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE CF UTAH 
IVAN J. HESLOP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
banking corporation, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable David E. 
Roth for jury trial on Monday, July 16, 1990, at the hour of 
9:30 a.m. The Court concluded nine days of trial on August 1, 
1990. Plaintiff, Ivan J. Heslop, was present at trial and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Ronald E. Griffin. 
Defendant, Bank of Utah, appeared through its designated 
representatives, Roy Nelson and Roderick Browning, and was 
represented by its counsel of record, Glenn C. Hanni and Stuart H. 




C i v i l No. 87099381 
Honorable David E. Roth 
1PM^<X 
indexed 
taken from witnesses called by both parties to this action and 
numerous exhibits were introduced into evidence. The jury rendered 
a special verdict through answers to interrogatories propounded by 
the Court. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant for general 
damages in the amount of $160,000.00 together with costs, to the 
date of judgment, in the amount of $ A /£~7< ~?<¥ / plus post-
judgment interest thereon at the legal rate'of 12% per annum from 
the date of entry until paid. 
DATED this _^£_£ day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
David 0*2* 
Second District Court 
-2-
ADDENDUM F 
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Ronald E. Griffin (4584) 
FREESTONE & GRIFFIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Bank Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IVAN J. HESLOP, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
BANK OF UTAH, A Utah ; 




) Case No. 87-099381-CV 
) Judge David E. Roth 
/ £ 
* % 
Defendant's MOTION FOR JUDGMENTNOTWITHSTANDINGTHE VERDICT, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL came before the court for hearing on 
Wednesday, October 3, 1990, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. Plaintiff was present and 
represented by counsel of record, Ronald E. Griffin. Defendant's Chairman of the Board 
of Directors, Roderick Browning, and President, Roy Nelson, were present and defendant 
was represented by counsel of record Glenn C Hanni. The court reviewed the extensive 
memoranda filed by counsel and heard oral argument from respective counsel. The court 
being fully advised in the premises, now, therefore, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. In compliance with Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., the grounds for the court's decision are: 
a. The instructions to the jury at trial were adequate and appropriate. 
b. The court is persuaded by the caselaw that holds that an implied in fact 
contract in a wrongful termination of employment case is not a violation of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
c. Evidence of the accrual problem, the investigations of the bank, and 
Thomas Timmon's hiring, all of which occurred within two years of plaintiffs discharge, was 
relevant to the case and not outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. 
d. The intervening event of Roderick Browning's negative response in January, 
1983, when plaintiff asked if Browning would like him to submit his resignation, applied 
more to the public policy issue than to the remaining issues in the case. 
e. Plaintiff opposed, and was sometimes critical of, several of management's 
decisions during 1981 and 1982 which affected his standing with management. The jurors 
had to be made aware of these facts before they could make a reasonable decision on the 
issue of constructive discharge. 
f. There was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of an implied 
in fact contract. Several senior bank officers testified that bank policy was to terminate 
employment only for just cause. The employment application signed by new employees at 
the bank did not rise to the dignity of an employment contract. Moreover, t.\cre was an 
2 
intervening quit and rehire of plaintiff. 
g. There was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that plaintiffs 
employment was not terminated for just cause. The jurors could have reasonably concluded 
that the firing of a bank employee with over 20 years experience for making one bad loan 
is not just cause for dismissal. 
h. There was suEotantial evidence to support the jury's finding of constructive 
discharge. The jurors could have reasonably concluded that Heslop's opposition to 
management decisions caused them to dislike him and consequently he was demoted and 
asked to resign. The jurors also could have concluded that plaintiff was asked to resign for 
making the Gabbert loan. 
i. Plaintiffs counsel's misstatement of the Ronald Draughon testimony in 
closing argument was not significant enough to make a difference in the case. Defendant's 
counsel could have objected to the misstatement but did not 
2. Defendant's MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL is denied. 
Dated t h i s / ^ day of October, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
'Datod-ETRoth 
Second District Court 
i3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER this _ 5 _ day of October, 1990, to: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Stuart H. Schultz, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 




Ronald E Griffin (4584) 
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslop 
The Valley Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IVAN J. HESLOP, ] 
Plaintiff, Appellee ] 
and Cross-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
BANK OF UTAH, A Utah ] 
Banking Corporation, ] 
Defendant, Appellant ] 
and Cross-Appellee. ] 
i NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
i Case No. 87-0999381-CV 
i Judge David E. Roth 
1
 **'• 2 6 I99Q 
Pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff, 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Ivan J. Heslop, hereby gives notice that he appeals certain 
orders of the above-entitled court made final by the judgment signed on August 27,1990 and 
entered on August 28, 1990. This appeal is taken from the Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated this<£/_ day o f November, 1990. / O 
Ronald E. Griffin 
CERTIFrrATE OF n w Tvpp Y 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL was 
hand-delivered on t h e ^ d a y of November, 1990, to: 
Glenn C Hanni 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 




V A No. 
2
 Q You knew that you could be terminated when you 
3
 left? I am talking about 1959. You knew you had signed 
4
 a contract that said you could be terminated at the will 
5
 of the bank. And that their only obligation was to pay 
6
 you through the last day you worked. You understood 
7
 that, didn't you? 
8 A I don't know when the concept that the policy 
9 would be that we would be promoted from within, and we 
10 would only be fired for cause came inf whether it was 
n before or after I left. So I would have to reserve my 
12 answer to say it may have been prior to my leaving the 
13 first time. But that definitely was a part of the 
14 conversation and the understanding upon my being hired 
15 j back to the bank. 
16 j Q That was part of the understanding that you 
would be—that there would be promotions from within, is 
that what you are saying? 
19 j A That's one of the items I mentioned, yes. 
20 Q And were you—when you were rehired in 1962, 
21 did anybody connected with the Bank of Utah say to you 
22
 we are going to hire you for six months, a year, six 
23 years, ten years; any fixed period of time? 





9 Q T 
ADDENDUM I 
1
 The bank was growing, and so that they were happy to 
2 have me employed again at the Bank of Utah. 
31 Q And this is what Beutler said to you? 
4
 A In substance. It was Beutler making most of 
5 the comments, most of the discussion as I recall. 
6 Q And so your understanding was when you went 
7
 back to work in 1962 that you were hired until you 
8 retired, unless there was good cause to discharge you, 
9 is that right? 
10 A Or major reduction in force that would also 
11 include me, yes. 
12 I Q And a t t h a t t ime you in tended t o r e t i r e at_whc 
13 age, 65? 




18 J was just cause to terminate you? 
19 A Yes, 
retirement then 
Q And so 
had been 
r yes. 
it was your 













20 Q Now when you started back at the bank in 1962, 
21 I believe you said you started as a commercial loan 
22 officer and an installment loan officer, is that correct 
23 A A loan officer in general, which would include 
24 I both departments, yes. 
25 Q Did there ever—what was the Bank of Utah—what 
9 
ADDENDUM J 
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Mr. Petty of A.G. office said to tell me "don't lose your 
notes. We don't want another damn Watergate." I said who told 
him I had any notes. I have never talked to him. 
9/23 Mr. Hines of A.G. office called saying they had 
received authorization to issue subpoenas and wanted to verify 
names of Heslop, Packer & Kennedy who will be served. 
ore) 10/11 I returned call to Atty Robert Moore's home. He 
asked me to meet at his office tomorrow at 4:30. 
10/12 Atty Moore "I have been retained by the Bank of Utah 
to represent the bank and its officers in the Attorney General's 
investigation." Ivan: Before we start will you be representing 
me all the way or could you have a conflict of interest." Moore: 
I don't think that will happen. Let me tell you how we are 
approaching the case. I have talked to Tom Timmons, CPA this 
afternoon. We feel there was a great deal of confusion about how 
to handle the situation. We are not disputing that the call 
report was wrong but no one really knew the significance of it 
and there was no intent to defraud. No money was taken, no 
depositor was denied his funds. It was just an error under 
Beutler's control and he handled it in his own way." 
Ivan: "What about ignorance of the law. what about the 
financial institution's law p. 194 7-1-318(1) & (3) & false call 
reports or false entries in the books." 
Moore: "That's the approach we are taking if the A.G. will 
cooperate. If he won't, he can take the position of charging 
everyone who had knowledge of the events with criminal intent. 
Do you understand what I said, this is very important. 
Ivan: Yes they could claim that we are all guilty of 
misrepresentation. But I did not agree with the solution used. 
I did not make false entries and I didn't sign any false 
statements. That is why I want an attorney who will represent me 
all the way. 






i ^* z^^ y J .-t if J ,. f/ 
-£&** sH*4^^L*J^ib ds^ak A<y/<wi <^ 
'Unx*c. 
10-12 cont'd 
Moore: I may not be able to do that if each officer has 
charges against him individually. But again I don't see the need 
for it. Tell me what was said at the A.G. office, who called, 
who was there. (I repeated the story) Did anyone contact you 
before this. Ivan: "No" Moore: "Had you talked to anyone else 
about having information about the TCD accruals. Ivan: I talked 
to the examiners Draughon & sangberg when they were first in the 
bank after Bill Beutler had been removed that we were concerned 
with the PCD expense accrual and the Com'l loan interest income 
accrual. I tried to assure them that we had honest, capable 
people remaining in the bank who could continue its management. 
I told them I had information which I had saved for the county 
attorney if there were an investigation. [This included a copy 
of the computer printout, the directors report and the published 
statement of Condition as of Dec. 31, 1981] 
Moore: Do you have any other notes or personal papers 
regarding these events. 
Ivan: I have made some personal notes. My job had been 
threatened and I thought I would need to present my case to the 
Board of Directors. When full disclosure was not made to the 
complete board of directors I made additional notes as to 
pertinent information. 
Moore: You haven't told me anything that I hadn!t already 
heard from others. I have never told a client to commit perjury. 
I have never advised a client to destroy evidence. However, 
there is some information the courts don't need. I want you to 
turn your notes over to me. Ivan: "Why? these are my personal 
notes and opinion. They could affect my rapport with the other 
officers I wdub^associated with. I have made the Bank of Utah my 
career. I would like to continue here. They wouldn't subpoena 
personal notes would they? 
Moore: They could unless they were in the hands of your 
/ ! .. f 
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10-12- 82 cont'd 
attorney. 
Ivan: That hardly seems fair- What kind of law is that 
anyway. 
Moore: It protects the attorney-client relationship similar 
to the Bishop, Priest or Rabbi or husband and wife cannot be 
compelled to testify against you. You see why I want those 
papers. 
Ivan: "Are you my attorney all the way in this? 
Moore: I told you I cannot guarantee that. If you don't 
feel comfortable with this you had better get yourself an 
attorney before Friday. Mr. Drake has given us until then to 
appear with Packer, Kennedy & you or they will issue subpoenas. 
We don't want that. 
Ivan: Can't we voluntarily appear for interviews but not 
submit any written materials this Friday? 
Moore: You donft believe what I am telling you anyway. You 
better get yourself an attorney. 
Ivan: Okay if your going to be that way - I didn't say I 
didn't believe you. I just feel that my records should be in my 
handSor my attorney and not in the hands of someone who could 
later use them against me. I don't have a personal attorney. I 
don't know who to t*ee./#5/f;^  
Moore: I suggest you call Paul Kunz for a recommendation of 
an attorney & verify what I have told you. 
10/13 I discussed the matter extensively with Paul Kunz. 
He assured me that my papers were under my control that my 
attorney is required to keep my information confidential & return 
it to me if I request and that he couldn't use info I had given 
him in confidence against me in behalf of another client. 
10/14 Paul Kunz came in the directors room 10:&0 am when we 
were about to begin our Exec Com meeting with Rod & said Wayne 
Black wants to meet with me & Paul Kunz in his office at 11:am. 
We left immediately & met with atty. Black who reviewed his plan 
for representing the Bank and its officers at the mini Grand Jury 
investigation at the Attorney General's office tomorrow: Phase I 
we willingly agree to interviews beginning with Tom Timmons of 
Pete Marwick & Mitchell CPA's. Later with Bank officers if 
needed but no records would be submitted. We plan to show there 
was an error in accounting, a great deal of confusion, 
differences of opinion as to how to handle the problem. The 
problem has been addressed, the records corrected, great effort 
extended to infuse capital, no money was taken personally and no 
depositor has been denied. It is in the best interest of those 
concerned & thq public to drop the investigation here. 
u^u^e^ be •?*<?*<?«. ^ 4 / ^ v f . 'TLr-fatl ?~^~,^'-.,,., , , , 
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10/14/82 (cont'd) (Wayne Black contin.) Phase II will be if 
they (A.G. office) insist on an intensive interrogation we will 
say we'll see you later fellows. That type of questioning should 
only be in Court. At that time we may no longer be able to 
represent you. But your papers would be yours and we could not 
use them against you. Paul Kunz agreed. 
Ivan: I may be naive but I will share my notes with you & 
Paul under those conditions. I read parts which pertain to the 
accrual acct. discussions in exec. com. mtgs etc. Now you see 
why these notes will not support your position and could be 
damaging to me in dealing with other officers of the bank. As we 
were leaving I said I was trying to remain complet^ separate from 
this situation and now I feel like I am the defendant. 
10/18 y:&c am. Paul Kunz called. Said hearing went well 
at A.G. office. They think A.G. will drop case but want to talk 
to V R K in a few days. No request for me to appear at this time 
& probably won't bef^Rod wants us to go on with our banking and 
stop talking about A.G. /^U>.i^ -? to anyone. Abut 10:30 am 
Bill Beutler called to see if 1/ had appeared at the A.G. yet. I 
told him I had not other than the 1st inquiry wherein I requested 
legal counsel present. However I was told this morning by Paul 
Kunz that the A.G. would possibly drop the inquiry & I would not 
need to appear. Further we have been advised to stop talking 
about the case inside the bank or out of it so I could not give 
him any details. He asked if I remembered the accrual situation 
being discussed in the Dec 4th Dir. Exec. Com. meeting. I told 
Bill I could not discuss it with him. I did not like being in 
the middle of the inquiry & hoped not to be asked to appear 
before the A.G. I am not trying to get revenge fxsjin him or 
anyone else and wanted only to respond as required by law. I am 
committed to tell the truth as I remember it. 
3:30 John Klas told me atty Boice had called the A.G. office 
today & asked for a "clean bill of health" for Bill Beutler. 
i-
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Oct^' 82 Met with Paul Kunz at Wayne Black's office. Mr. 
Black said he is representing all of the bank officers in meeting 
with the attorney general's office- The approach will be as 
follows: 1st we don't want any subpoenas, we will go up to the 
A.G.fs office in an informal unrecorded voluntary atmosphere, if 
they start asking questions that are too incriminating we will 
stop the interview. We will represent that Mr. Beutler made 
erroneous entries in the bank's ledgers, when it came time to 
publish the call report some wanted to treat it one way some 
another. Mr. Beutler wanted to correct the error in the 
succeeding months which the bank directors agreed to do. we are 
not representing Mr. Beutler. He has left the bank. He has his 
own attorney. He made the erroneous entries. The directors 
relied on him as the senior bank accountant in making the entries 
and preparing the call report. 
Ivan: That's why you don't want me to go to the AG!s office 
with you. I would prefer to appear only by subpoena and with 
personal legal counsel present. 
Black: Why not appear voluntarily? 
Ivan: Because Bill Beutler didn't make the decision alone. 
The Bank directors exec, committee all knew of the discrepancies 
in December before the December directors meeting. The decisions 
to not report the discrepancy to the full board of directors or 
the Gov't examiners and to pay the regular dividend and profit 
sharing distribution were made by the dir. exec, committee with 
the full knowledge of the shortage which they thought was about 
$700,000.00. 
w. Black: Do you have records to that effect. Ivan: I 
made notes of the conversation and meetings after the directors 
exec. com. mtg in December. To me it was a serious violation of 
the Utah Code with possible criminal charges. I do not want to 
voluntarily testify against any of the bank's officers. I prefer 
to be subpoenaed and have the protection of the court as well as 
my own legal counsel. I want to protect my position of innocence 
in the way this matter was handled without destroying my rapport 
with the people for whom I am employed. 
W. Black: If you let me hold your notes the court cannot 
subpoena them. 
Ivan: I don't intend to withhold information from the 
courts. My notes aren't that big of a deal anyway. There is no 
big criminal secret being withheld. (I reviewed the notes with 
Wayne Black & Paul Kunz) 
Wayne Black: Let me hold the notes here in my desk for my 
eyes only and you can have them back whenever you ask for them. 
Paul Kunz agreed with w. Black. 
Ivan: Maybe I am naive in doing this but I have full 
confidence in Paul Kunz. I am trying to cooperate without 
becoming personally implicated. 
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Oct. 
Oct met with atty Robert Moore who said he could not commit 
to represent me all the way through A.G. investigation. He said 
he wanted my notes. I told him I want an attorney to represent 
me. Moore: If you don't believe me you better get yourself an 
attorney & you need one by Friday. Ivan: I didnft say I don!t 
believe you. I said I want an attorney to represent me without a 
conflict of interest. Later met with Paul Kunz and Wayne Black. 
[See next page] 
Nov 15, 1982 - met with Wayne Black & Hines & Drake at atty 
Gen's office. Wayne Black to see C. Drake: We need to end this 
investigation right here. There are some prominent people 
involved and a man's professional career is at stake. Drake: we 
are trying to extend professional courtesy to Mr. Kunz & 
cooperate as much as possible but there is a certain amount of 
investigation we need to do. W. Black: We admit there were 
errors in the call report of 12/31/81. At the time there was 
confusion among bank management as to how it should be handled. 
Ivan is an activist he wanted to take certain action right now. 
Others wanted to take a more methodical approach. I told them I 
didn't think any of the directors signed the call report with 
intent to defraud. They were acting on the information given 
them that no one had taken any money from the bank. The question 
of knowingly signing false statements would have to be 
interpreted by the A.G.'s office or the Courts. 
11/18/82 - Bill Beutler called. Wanted to verify I had met 
with A.G. office. What was the line of questioning. Did I tell 
them the accrual procedure was discussed prior to 12/31/81 by 
Officers & Directors exec. com. he has separate attorney ready to 
file suit against E. Weiss, Department of Fin. Inst, if he is not 
soon cleared. Told him I expressed opinion that those who signed 
call reports did so with varying degree of knowledge but none had 
criminal intent. Said I had withheld some info that I did not 
want to voluntarily disclose, except in court. 
12/15/82 Rod Browning announced Tom Timmons of Peat Marwick 
Mitchell & Co. is going to be new president of Bank of Utah. 
12/23/82 Rod Browning told Ray, Jim & I that the A.G. 
office has reported to the dept of fin Institution that their 
investigation has been closed. When they will give a written 
statement to this effect is not known but is expected soon. Then 
Tom Timmons will start working at the bank as our new president. 
ADDENDUM K 
DAVID S. KUNZ - Bank o f Utah B i l l i n g - O c t o b e r 1982 
DATE MATTER TIME 
- 1 2 - 8 2 
- 1 3 - 8 2 
- 1 4 - 8 2 
• 1 5 - 8 2 
- 1 8 - 8 2 
- 1 9 - 8 2 
- 2 5 - 8 2 
- 2 6 - 8 2 
- 1 - 8 2 
- 2 - 8 1 
Reviewed, typed up narrative of accounting 
problems with Jerry Peacock. 2 Hrs. Call to 
Bob Moore re approach to Attorney General. 
4 Hrs. Long .conversation .with^BQk M.Qpre after, 
he talked withTlvan. " " "" 
6 Hrs, 
Long conversation with Bob Moore, Wayne Black re: 
Report to Rod, Jim, Ray re same. Confernece with 
Paul re same. 
Long conversations with Bob Moore and Wayne Black 
re meeting with Attorney General with Timmons. 
Calls to Ron Boyce, conferences with Rod, Jim, Ray, 
Report to Rod re Washington handling of Tennessee 
Homestead with Ben Quinn. 
Conference, Rod, Ray, Paul re: Attorney General. 
Long telephone conversation, Moore & Black re 
report and future handling. Telephone converaation 
with Ron Boyce. Letter to John Hawke re Tenneaaee 
Homestead. 
Calls to Ron Boyd re Bill. Conference with Ray 
Kennedy (several) and Rod Browning. 
Phone calls to Boyce and Moore 
Research re: letter to auditor. 
Preparation of letter to auditor. 
1 Hr. 30 Min. letter to auditor. 45 Min. Ben 
Quinn, property descriptions for Jerry Hawke. 
Met with Glen Hanni 2 Hrs. re Research Planning 
Case. 1/2 Hr. with Ben (Vir.;) on Fed application. 
Met with Fen Quinn on Fed application. 
1920 Minutes - 32 Hrs. @ $80.00 Per Hr. -
$2,560.00 
Plus the following telephone calls: 
9-14-82 Washington, D.C. to Ogden 
9-20-82 San Francisco to Ogden 
9-20-82 San Francisco to Ogden 
•9-28-82 Ogden to San Francisco 
9-27-82 Ogden to San Francisco 
5 Hrs. 
4 Hrs. 45 Min. 
5 Hra. 30 Min, 
2 Hra. 
30 Min. 
1 Hra. 30 Min, 
2 Hrs. 25 Min. 








TOTAL AMOUNT DUE $2,587.46 
ADDENDUM L 
them- So I am not real thrilled with all of that. It 
seems to me if you had some law on an important issue 
you know was going to be an issue prior to trial, I 
should have had it prior to the trial. 
If you have law that applies to the Instructions you 
are going to submit, you know what the Instructions are 
prior to trial, it would have been nice to have those. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I didn't know there would be an 
objection. It is very clear cut based on the cases. 
THE COURT: Clear cut that you are entitled to 
attorney fees in this case? It is your position 
attorney fees are— 
MR. GRIFFIN: The Beck case. 
THE COURT: I would be pioneering to say that 
you are entitled to attorney fees in this case. And you 
should have understood that. 
MR- GRIFFIN: Well, I have got the Canyon 
Country Store case. 
THE COURT: I have read the Canyon Country 
Store case this morning, and the 
MR. GRIFFIN: And—well, 
That the Berube case states that 
Beck case this morning. 
my position is this: 
consequential damages 
can be awarded in wnrongful termination cases. 
THE COURT: The consequential damages involved 
things other than attorney fees. And there is no 
24 
25 
MR. HANNI: And we object to those because—we 
objected at the time they were offered, and I don't 
recall that your Honor ruled at the time. 
THE COURT: I ruled when they were offered that 
they were not admissible, and we wouldn't go into the 
whole relationship between the Bank of Utah and Peate, 
Marwick, Mitchell. Subsequent to that, we did go into 
the entire relationship between the bank and Peate, 
Marwick and Mitchell. I think following that it is an 
appropriate exhibit and will be admitted. I will note 
the Defendant's objection for the record. 
There is an issue of whether or not Plaintiff's 
attorney fees could logically be considered 
consequential damages in this case. And I have ruled 
that they are not. And I will not allow that issue to 
go to the Jury. 
The only quest 
that may have resu 
employment. I don 
ion of damage 
lted from the 
't know that 









state my reasons on the record. If this case reaches 
the point whe: re that should be appealed, 
impression that the evidence on that is 






it is my 
pretty clear cut 
to a directed verdict should the 
I am wrong, and I have to award 
in the form of attorney fees. 
ADDENDUM M 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
